

TRAINING MATERIALS AND WORKSHOPS DURING THE ADAC.IO PROJECT

Summary of Activities

ADAC.IO Publication – Deliverable 4.1

Timo Lenk, TU Dortmund University

TRAINING MATERIALS AND WORKSHOPS DURING THE ADAC.io PROJECT

Summary of Activities – Final Report

ADAC.io Publication – Deliverable 4.1

2024 – 2026

Timo Lenk, TU Dortmund University

Contact: timo.lenk@tu-dortmund.de | adacio.eu

Executive Summary

Summary of activities undertaken to develop and deliver training materials and workshops on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) during the Horizon-Europe funded ADAC.io project.

The ADAC.io project (Attribution, Data Analysis, Countermeasures, Interoperability) set out to protect democracy in the European Union by strengthening the ability to deny the intended effects of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) on society. A project of this kind only achieves impact if its concepts, tools, and findings reach the people who analyse and counter information manipulation in practice. Work Package 4 was dedicated to that task: developing training materials and delivering workshops, talks and outreach that carry ADAC.io's work to journalists, fact-checkers, researchers, public institutions, civil-society organisations, and students.

This report documents the training and dissemination activities delivered under Deliverable 4.1 throughout roughly two years, from 2024 to 2026. TU Dortmund University led this strand of work, in close collaboration with consortium partners – in particular the DISARM Foundation / Alliance4Europe on the fact-checker and journalist workshops, and Debunk.org on a workshop dedicated to AI in the context of FIMI. The activities range from a fully developed, openly available university course to one-off conference talks, and from deep-dive expert exchanges to online workshops reaching audiences of counter-disinformation practitioners across dozens of countries.

The body of this report, “Project Outputs”, gives an overview of what was produced and delivered, organised by the kind of activity and the communities reached. Annex A then provides illustrative examples for each individual event and training product, including slides, workshop screenshots, photographs, and other supporting materials, so that the reader can see the work as it was experienced by participants.

Acknowledgements:

This deliverable was edited and authored by Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University). The training and dissemination work documented here was carried out by a wider team at TU Dortmund University. Christina Elmer, lead of Work Package 4, provided overall guidance and reviewed all training materials and reports. Nico Hornig helped establish connections to the fact-checking community. Linda Schmitz and Klara Loser, student assistants at TU Dortmund University, supported the preparation and implementation of the workshops. The author thanks them all for their guidance and contributions.

Table of Contents

1. Project Outputs.....	5
1.1. A comprehensive academic training resource: the ADAC.io online course.....	5
1.2. Engaging journalists and fact-checking communities.....	6
1.2.1. Introducing FIMI and DISARM to the journalistic community.....	6
1.2.2. Equipping fact-checkers: the DISARM v1.7 update.....	7
1.2.3. A cross-cutting theme: how AI shapes FIMI.....	8
1.2.4. Feedback into the DISARM Framework.....	10
1.3. Dialogue with public institutions and the policy community.....	10
1.4. Embedding the work in academia and education.....	11
“First German workshop on detecting and addressing misinformation for communication practitioners” at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin.....	11
2. Summary of activities.....	12
3. Annex A: Illustrative Examples by Activity.....	15
3.1. Education.....	16
3.2. Academia.....	20
3.3. Journalists.....	28
3.4. Fact-checkers.....	32
3.5. Public institutions and policymakers.....	42
3.6. Media and public institutions.....	48
3.7. Business.....	49
Acknowledgement of funding.....	51

Note: An additional **Annex B**, “Slide Decks by Activity”, accompanies this report. It compiles the presentation slide decks underlying the activities described in the report, organised by the same audience groupings used in Annex A. It includes the decks for the individual activities, together

with a selection of materials from the ADAC.io online course, namely the course plan, the glossary, and the coding exercise (in tagged and untagged versions). The full set of lesson slide decks from the online course is not reproduced, both because of their volume and because they are permanently and publicly available online at adacio.eu/online-course. A few of the decks were presented and delivered in German; for these, a short English summary precedes the original slides in Annex B.

1. Project Outputs

Across a period of roughly two years, the project delivered a coherent body of training and dissemination work. At its centre is a reusable, openly licensed university course; around it sits a programme of workshops and talks tailored to distinct professional communities, and a set of public-facing outreach activities. This section summarises that work; the annexes document each activity in turn.

In total, the project delivered **16 distinct events and engagements, alongside a full-semester ADAC.io university online course** on information manipulation that was tested at two universities during the project phase. Together, these reached academic, journalistic, fact-checking, institutional, nonprofit, business and student audiences across Europe and beyond.

1.1. A comprehensive academic training resource: the ADAC.io online course

The most extensive single training output is the ADAC.io online course, “Introduction to Information Manipulation”. Developed at TU Dortmund University and published openly on adacio.eu, the course offers a structured, accessible introduction to how disinformation is shaped and circulated in contemporary media environments, with a particular focus on FIMI and on the approaches used to analyse and counter it.

The course is built for the university classroom but works equally well for self-study. It comprises fourteen lessons across four modules, accompanied by twelve sets of slides, links to interactive materials, group exercises, and a glossary defining more than one hundred conceptual terms – from standard terminology related to mis- and disinformation to more complex notions of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and related terms such as Influence Operations and Hybrid Warfare. The publicly available materials, including a course guide, the glossary, an introductory video and downloadable slide sets for each lesson, represent roughly twenty-five to thirty hours of study. The course was tested with students from a B.A. programme in Journalism at TU Dortmund University and an M.A. programme in Strategic Communications at the University of Münster, covering both a STEM-focused and a comprehensive university, before release.

The four modules move from foundational concepts to practical analysis, countermeasures, and resilience:

Module 1 introduces and reflects on the core vocabulary – mis-, dis- and malinformation, propaganda, conspiracy theories, and newer notions such as “bullshit”, “systemic lies” and “shock-and-chaos” – and how these terms and concepts have changed over time.

Module 2 examines the contextual factors that shape the spread and impact of manipulative content: post-truth culture, manipulative rhetoric, cognitive biases, and echo-chamber dynamics, supported by interactive simulations and further learning materials.

Module 3 turns to coordinated, strategic campaigns, including concepts such as astroturfing, coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB), and FIMI, and introduces the ABCDE and DISARM Frameworks, including a hands-on coding exercise built around the WP4 case study on the 2024 European elections.

Module 4 addresses countermeasures, from short-term interventions such as debunking, prebunking, and inoculation to the long-term roles of government, platforms, education, journalism and advertising in building a whole-of-society approach to societal resilience.

The course materials are licensed CC BY-NC 4.0 and are available at adacio.eu/online-course. By packaging the project's research into a free, reusable teaching resource, the course extends ADAC.io's reach beyond the lifetime of the project itself.

1.2. Engaging journalists and fact-checking communities

Engaging journalistic and fact-checking communities was a central strand of Work Package 4, since these are the practitioners who most often encounter information manipulation first and whose findings, when expressed in a shared language, can be compared and connected across actors of the FIMI defender community. This section groups that work into introductory training for the wider journalistic community, and dedicated workshops with fact-checkers designed to gather feedback on the v1.7 version of the DISARM Framework, followed by a cross-cutting strand on the role of AI, which touched every audience the project reached, and a short note on the input these workshops returned for refining the DISARM Framework tailored to these user groups.

1.2.1. Introducing FIMI and DISARM to the journalistic community

The first joint ADAC.io and DISARM workshop, delivered online on 18 March 2025 by representatives of the DISARM Foundation and TU Dortmund University, introduced FIMI and the DISARM Framework to a mixed group of 20 journalists and fact-checkers. The participants were drawn from an international cross-section of the field, including The Ferret (Scotland), Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (rbb), researchers from the University of Helsinki, VERA Files (Philippines), and several freelance investigators, working, for example, for German public service broadcasting (ZDF, WDR). This constituted a room that made for a focused, hands-on session and sparked engagement with FIMI and the DISARM Framework across disciplinary and regional boundaries.

The workshop was structured in three parts. The first unpacked FIMI itself: its EEAS definition as a “mostly non-illegal”, intentional and coordinated pattern of behaviour; its goals (e.g. interfering with political processes, polarising publics, and alienating people from institutions and elites); and the way it is operated at industrial scale, illustrated by the Pravda network’s dissemination of an estimated 3.6 million pro-Kremlin articles per year. It introduced strategic narratives through a vivid worked example – China’s reframing of Japan’s 2023 release of treated Fukushima wastewater into a narrative of reckless radioactive contamination – and presented the project’s own case study of manipulation activities targeting EU climate policies in the run-up to the 2024 European elections, tracing recurring narrative tactics such as drawing on existing grievances, responding to breaking-news events, and the merging of propaganda messages between foreign and domestic actors. This section led into the vocabulary of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and the “5D” model – Dismiss, Distort, Distract, Dismay, Divide – each illustrated with real campaign examples. The second part covered the basics of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) in the context of FIMI analysis, and the third introduced the DISARM Framework’s taxonomy and its advantages, applying it to a case study so that participants could see how its use renders messy real-world manipulation into structured, shareable analysis.

The project carried the same introduction to the wider journalistic community at a dedicated conference. At SciCAR 2025 – a conference at the intersection of science journalism (Sci) and computer-assisted reporting (CAR) – the project ran an interactive on-site workshop, co-delivered with Alliance4Europe, for an audience of investigative and data journalists. Structured in three parts, it moved from the building blocks of information manipulation campaigns – including narratives, TTPs, the 5Ds, and the increasing use of AI, illustrated with the Doppelganger and Pravda campaigns – through OSINT tools and techniques, to a practical introduction to the DISARM Framework’s taxonomy and a brief demonstration of OpenCTI, a cyber threat intelligence (CTI) platform for storing and sharing structured analysis, which was carried over from its original field of cybersecurity to disinformation analysis. The recurring message was that verifying facts and identifying manipulation techniques (TTPs) are complementary aspects of journalistic reporting about information manipulation activities.

1.2.2. Equipping fact-checkers: the DISARM v1.7 update

Fact-checkers occupy a central place in societal resilience against information operations; false narratives lie at the core of most manipulation campaigns, and fact-checkers are often the first to encounter them, so a sustained strand of WP4 work was dedicated to them. The throughline of that work was interoperability: equipping fact-checkers with a shared analytical language so their findings can be compared, aggregated, and connected to the work of other researchers, Open-Source-Investigators, and analysts specialised in FIMI.

Through conducting dedicated online workshops, WP4 supported the roll-out and iterative development of a dedicated fact-checkers’ version of the DISARM Framework, released as version 1.7. This encompassed two “DISARM for Fact-checkers” workshops, delivered jointly by the DISARM Foundation, Alliance4Europe, and TU Dortmund University. Each session walked a

focused audience of fact-checkers and researchers dedicated to fact-checking through the FIMI threat landscape, including concrete examples of campaigns such as Operation Overload, which floods newsrooms and fact-checkers with spam-like verification requests to drain their resources, the Pravda / Portal Kombat network, and the pro-Beijing Spamoouflage network, highlighting the significance of interoperability between different stakeholders, before introducing DISARM theory and outlining the specialised version for fact-checkers. Drawing on the “Pyramid of Pain” borrowed from cybersecurity – the principle that disrupting an adversary’s TTPs is far more challenging than blocking individual artefacts such as IP addresses – the slides then walked through the v1.7 update itself, presenting the new fact-checker observables alongside real debunks that illustrate each one, e.g. historic or out-of-context footage presented as current, edits that reframe a news report, video-game or entertainment footage passed off as real events, AI-generated content presented as authentic, and satire presented as non-satire. Showing each technique next to a concrete fact-check made clear how the specialised framework maps directly onto the cases fact-checkers handle every day. The sessions closed with hands-on coding exercises and structured feedback, by design, in order to gather as much expert input as possible to refine the Framework.

Demand was such that two sessions were held (on 29 January and 28 April 2026) so that those unable to attend the first could join the second. To assemble the right room, the organising team did not rely on open advertising alone: alongside promotion through the project’s channels, particularly on LinkedIn, they reached out individually to representatives of key fact-checking organisations across Europe and the UK. The result was a pair of compact sessions in which a smaller group size of 15-20 registered participants was a deliberate feature, allowing genuine dialogue and detailed, technique-level feedback on the v1.7 Framework. Participants were drawn from fact-checking organisations, the OSINT community, civil-society initiatives, and universities across Europe, Asia and beyond, including Fundación Maldita.es (Spain), the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), TrustMyContent (France), UK OSINT Community (UK), the Movement Against Disinformation (Philippines), FactWatch (Bangladesh), the Polish Academy of Science, Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC) at the Technical University of Darmstadt, and Aarhus University.

These workshops were closely tied to the wider objectives of the DISARM v1.7 update, documented in ADAC.io [Deliverable 2.2](#), *The Development of the DISARM Red Framework During ADAC.io Project*. The update set out to integrate practitioner feedback and to respond to the evolving ways in which disinformation campaigns operate, with the goal of producing improved user resources for analysing, sharing, and comparing analyses across fact-checking and other organisations. The WP4 workshops fed directly into these aims: by introducing the specialised techniques to fact-checkers and gathering structured, technique-level feedback through hands-on exercises, they supplied exactly the practitioner input needed to further refine the update, while building the user base and shared vocabulary on which the Framework’s interoperability depends.

1.2.3. A cross-cutting theme: how AI shapes FIMI

Because AI now sits at the heart of how information manipulation is produced and spread, shaping both the creation of content and its amplification, WP4 dedicated a workshop specifically to the intersection of AI and FIMI, a relevance the session itself made plain. The workshop, “How AI Shapes FIMI”, was delivered online on 27 November 2025 jointly by TU Dortmund University and Debunk.org. It responded directly to a recommendation from the project’s first reviewer report to integrate AI perspectives into ADAC.io’s outputs, and it struck a clear chord with the community: the 90-minute session drew 140 registrations and 65 live participants spanning journalism, the private sector, nonprofits, as well as policy and regulatory institutions, attending from a strikingly broad geography including Lithuania, Germany, Belgium, Slovakia, Turkey, Greece, Brazil, Ethiopia, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Poland, Finland, Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Latvia and the United States. For an online expert workshop on a specialist topic, that spread across four continents is a notable indication of how timely the subject has become.

The workshop set out to leave participants able to recognise the evolution of disinformation tactics from pre-AI methods to generative-AI campaigns, to identify how AI and large language models (LLMs) are leveraged in real-world FIMI operations, and to understand why the combination of AI and FIMI is such a growing challenge. It opened by establishing relevance: drawing on the [3rd EEAS Report on FIMI](#), it noted that generative AI gives threat actors a low-cost way to create inauthentic content and scale up their activities, while public risk-perception lags far behind – a meta-study of 496 peer-reviewed articles was cited to show AI being used as a “spreader” across all major platforms, against survey data showing that, although a majority of Europeans see false information as a problem for democracy, knowledge of AI’s role remains underdeveloped, posing a serious threat to democratic resilience against AI-related manipulation activities.

From there the session contrasted the labour-intensive methods of the past – troll farms, sock puppet accounts, templated content and social bots, which are all relatively easy to detect – with the notable change brought by generative AI, which lowers cost, increases speed, and enables personalisation and micro-targeting. The heart of the workshop was a sequence of real-world case studies, each examined for how it actually used AI: Operation Overload, with its AI-generated voiceovers mimicking real news organisations; the Pravda / Portal Kombat network and its strategy of ‘LLM grooming’, i.e., flooding the web with propaganda content so that AI chatbots absorb and repeat its narratives; CopyCop / ‘False Façade’, which used AI to clone the templates and logos of Western media and to micro-target tailored content; and ‘Real Reliable News’ (RRN), which leaned on deepfakes and AI-amplified fake accounts. The discussion drew on several striking figures – a 1,740% rise in detected deepfakes in North America between 2022 and 2023, a single AI-assisted post about USAID gaining over 4.2 million views, and the finding that roughly 80% of flagged AI-generated posts remain online after identification.

Crucially, the workshop resisted alarmism: a recurring takeaway was that the use of AI does not necessarily make operations more effective – it makes them cheaper and faster. The final segment turned to surveying how analysts can counter AI-assisted manipulation through AI-powered detection tools and multimedia forensics and demonstrated practical instruments such as deepfake scanners and AI voice detectors. Interactive quizzes throughout let participants apply what they had learned in real time. Although the workshop is presented here as a cross-cutting theme, for the purposes of Annex A it is documented alongside the fact-checker materials (Annex 9), reflecting the audience that formed its primary focus.

The same AI-and-disinformation perspective was carried to a business and organisational audience a few months earlier, when the project contributed an impulse talk, “What Is Still True? Disinformation in the Age of AI”, to the SWF Forum 2025, the annual forum of the systemic consultancy Simon, Weber and Friends, with the title “Communication and AI”, organised in Berlin, Germany, May 2025, with around 100 participants from international consulting firms and corporations. The contribution distinguished an input perspective, referring to manipulation achieved by influencing the data on which AI systems draw, from an output perspective, in which generative AI is used to mass-produce manipulative content, and closed with a deep-dive into the DISARM Framework, with particular focus on techniques referring to AI-assisted / automated infrastructure creation, content dissemination, and narrative amplification activities. This engagement was based on the premise that, from a whole-of-society-approach to democratic resilience, the private sector also plays an important role in the chain of defence against disinformation, both providing and maintaining critical infrastructure and handling large amounts of highly sensitive data.

1.2.4. Feedback into the DISARM Framework

Across all workshops including journalists and fact-checkers, participants were also asked to provide feedback on what they see as the essential dimensions of improvement for the DISARM Framework in order to make it easily adoptable and useful for their communities. Overall, participants mentioned the following points which also fed into the development of DISARM v1.7 update:

- A more clearly structured framework with fewer techniques for easier accessibility and lower thresholds for use,
- Specific definitions, real-world examples, and related techniques for each technique in the Framework,
- Common patterns and references to known disinformation campaigns (e.g., to write more contextual reports),
- A more flexible internal search function based on the impression that users already have to know what they are looking for in order to search effectively within the Framework.

1.3. Dialogue with public institutions and the policy community

WP4 also carried the project's analyses and tool developments into institutional and policy settings. It contributed a talk on TTPs and patterns of digital information manipulation to a Cybersecurity and Disinformation Conference titled "Inter-regional Platform for Cybersecurity Research", convened under the Ministry of the Interior of North Rhine-Westphalia. The talk shared a programme with the German Cyberagentur, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), the fact-checking newsroom CORRECTIV, Fraunhofer FKIE, and the Center for Advanced Internet Studies (CAIS), before an audience of representatives from the security and related divisions of state agencies and state interior ministries across Germany. This placed FIMI analysis squarely alongside the German cybersecurity and security-policy community and underscored the shared logic of TTPs across the two fields. Bringing together expertise from these fields produces a comprehensive picture of all facets of hybrid threats.

TU Dortmund University also took part in a panel on information resilience at DisinfoCon Berlin 2025, organised by ADAC.io partner Alliance4Europe and Democracy Reporting International (DRI). The event was held on the premises of the Canadian Embassy in Berlin, with a group of over 100 participants from civil society organisations, public agencies, media, business, and think tanks. The discussion grappled with how the work of civil society, media, academia, and government could be connected into a coordinated, whole-of-society response, as well as with the tensions involved, such as the productive distance journalism must keep from government, potential resource conflicts between short-term fact-checking and long-term resilience-building, and the funding structures that leave many overlapping academic projects without follow-through.

Finally, ADAC.io was featured on an episode of the EU-funded SAUFEX podcast, where the discussion drew on a communication-research perspective to unpack the social, technical, political, and cultural factors that shape information disorders and influence operations, along with what can be done to address them at a societal level, broadening the project's reach to the audiences of its sister initiatives.

1.4. Embedding the work in academia and education

A consistent thread of academic engagement ran throughout the project, ensuring its concepts entered scholarly debate. The earliest contribution, part of a series of invited research talks – "Cutting-edge Communication Research" – at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (CeCoR @ ASCoR), University of Amsterdam (2024), introduced the concept of FIMI to strategic-communication, political communication, and journalism scholars and argued for treating disinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy narratives as elements of a broader pattern of information operations.

Further engagements included

- a conceptual contribution on FIMI and a methodological contribution covering DISARM at a two-day workshop on “Moral panics, communication networks and polarisation” organised by the Chair of Development Politics at the Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau (2026),
- a presentation on behavioural and narrative patterns across actors as part of a panel on disinformation, journalism, and democracy, jointly submitted with researchers from Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz and the University of the Bundeswehr Munich at the annual conference of the German Communication Association, DGPK (2026),
- and a contribution to a journalism-focused research colloquium at the Erich-Brost-Institute for International Journalism (2025), facilitating exchange between European disinformation research projects and projects from the Global South (Mexico and Brazil).

Across these talks, the project introduced ADAC.io’s core terminology (FIMI, TTPs, DISARM) to an interdisciplinary audience and presented case-study results from Work Package 4, Deliverable 4.2.

“First German workshop on detecting and addressing misinformation for communication practitioners” at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin

ADAC.io also contributed to the “first German-language practitioner workshop on detecting and addressing misinformation”, held at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. It brought together participants from across German media and public institutions, with around 40 practitioners from outlets such as DER SPIEGEL, DIE ZEIT, Deutschlandradio, WDR and MDR and agencies including the Robert Koch Institute, the Umweltbundesamt and the BZgA. ADAC.io’s contribution sat alongside lecturers from the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, University of Bristol, University of Potsdam, Radboud University, and TU Dresden University, engaged in international projects on countering disinformation and strengthening democratic resilience, such as SoMe4Dem, PRODEMINFO, and the German-Austrian Digital Media Observatory (GADMO), the German-language hub of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) network.

The whole-day programme moved across the field, from why people believe and share misinformation to the tools available for countering it, with sessions on credibility assessment, the detection of low-quality information, inoculation, debunking, and OSINT. ADAC.io’s own contribution situated disinformation within the broader concept of information manipulation and introduced techniques that go beyond false information alone, including the exploitation of real-world grievances, emotionalisation and moralisation, as well as amplification through CIB and information flooding. These techniques were illustrated with real-world cases such as the staged protests against the 2023 release of Fukushima wastewater and the exploitation of local grievances by Russian propaganda during the 2024 European elections. The presentation

closed by introducing the DISARM Framework, comparing it with other classification schemes, and showing how its catalogue of techniques helps practitioners describe and share what they observe.

2. Summary of activities

The table below lists all training and dissemination activities documented in this report, listed by date. Detailed descriptions and illustrative material for each are provided in annex A, listed by primary audience community.

Date	Activity	Primary Audience	Format
20 June 2024	CeCoR @ ASCoR (University of Amsterdam)	Communication scholars (Academia)	Guest lecture
October 2024 – February 2025	University seminars: TU Dortmund University & University of Münster (WWU) (served as the testbed for the development of the ADAC.io online course)	Students (Education)	Full university seminars (two cohorts)
31 October 2024	PROK 2024, Berlin (Annual conference of the Public Relations and Organisational Communication Division of the German Communication Association)	Communication scholars (Academia)	Conference talk
18 March 2025	Online workshop: Introduction to FIMI and DISARM	Investigative journalists and fact-checkers (Journalists)	Interactive online workshop
22 May 2025	SWF Forum 2025	Business consultants (Business)	Keynote impulse and panel discussion
26 May 2025	First German workshop on detecting and addressing misinformation (MPI Berlin)	Nonprofits, media organisations, public institutions	Full-day in-person workshop

Date	Activity	Primary Audience	Format
		(Media and public institutions)	
5 September 2025	SciCAR 2025 (Science + Computer-Assisted Reporting conference)	Investigative and data journalists (Journalists)	Interactive in-person workshop
19 September 2025	SAUFEX podcast	Policy actors and interested publics (Public institutions and policy makers)	Podcast episode
27 October 2025	Cybersecurity & Disinformation Conference / Länderübergreifende Plattform Cybersicherheitsforschung (NRW)	State agencies and state interior ministries (Public institutions and policy makers)	Conference talk
11 November 2025	DisinfoCon Berlin 2025	Civil society organisations and policy actors (Public institutions and policy makers)	Conference panel contribution
27 November 2025	Online workshop: How AI Shapes FIMI (TU Dortmund University & Debunk.org)	Mixed, with an emphasis on fact-checkers (Fact-checkers)	Interactive online workshop
9 December 2025	Erich-Brost-Institute for International Journalism Colloquium	Journalism scholars (Academia)	Research colloquium
29 January 2026	DISARM for Fact-checkers – Workshop (session 1)	Fact-checkers (Fact-checkers)	Interactive online workshop

Date	Activity	Primary Audience	Format
20-21 February 2026	Moral Panics, Communication Networks and Polarisation (University of Passau)	Political science scholars (Academia)	Academic workshop panels (two contributions)
19 March 2026	DGPuK annual conference (panel: Journalism in Democratic Society)	Communication scholars (Academia)	Conference panel contribution
28 April 2026	DISARM for Fact-checkers – Workshop (session 2)	Fact-checkers (Fact-checkers)	Interactive online workshop

Note on figures: workshop screenshots reproduced in the annex are records of live online sessions provided by the project for this deliverable. Participants gave their verbal consent for the screenshots. Participant lists and registration data were used only to derive aggregate figures (such as attendance counts and the types of organisations represented); no personal contact details are reproduced here.

3. Annex A: Illustrative Examples by Activity

Starting on the next page, this annex documents each activity in turn, grouped by the audience community it primarily served. This includes education (3.1; annex 1), academia (3.2; annex 2-6), journalists (3.3; annex 7-8), fact-checkers (3.4; annex 9-11), public institutions and policymakers (3.5; annex 12-14), media and public institutions (3.6; annex 15), and business (3.7; annex 16). For every event it gives the key details – date, primary audience, format, and presenter – a short description, and one or more illustrative visual impressions, e.g. a title slide, a content slide, an interactive element, or a workshop screenshot.

The audience groupings should be read as a guide to each activity's primary focus rather than as firm boundaries. Several of the events documented here in fact reached mixed audiences, and many of the materials were designed to be useful across more than one community. The categories below are therefore a way of organising the material for readability, not a claim that the communities they name are neatly separable. This annex follows a fixed audience taxonomy rather than the thematic sequence of the report body or the chronological order of the summary table; Annex B is organised in the same audience order.

3.1. Education

Annex 1. University seminars: TU Dortmund University & University of Münster (WWU)

Date: October 2024 – February 2025 **Primary Audience:** Students **Format:** Full university seminars (two cohorts)

Title: The Manipulation Machinery: Communication-Science Perspectives on Strategic Disinformation
Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io: Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

Running across the 2024/25 winter term, two parallel university seminars carried ADAC.io's research directly into the classroom. Delivered at TU Dortmund University and the University of Münster (WWU), the seminar examined the tactics and techniques employed in information operations and the social-psychological mechanisms that shape their effects, with FIMI as the organising concept for cases of externally driven interference in democratic processes.

Both seminars served as an applied testbed for the teaching materials that were later consolidated into the ADAC.io online course materials. Student evaluations from the two cohorts fed back into the refinement of the lesson structure and the accompanying slide sets. The course plan is attached to this report (Annex B).




Figure 1.1: Seminar tools and materials used in the Münster (WWU) and TU Dortmund University (TUDO) seminars: throughout the semester, students took notes and sketched ideas using Miro-slides prepared in advance. Exemplary Miro-board, WWU cohort





Figure 1.2: Exemplary Miro-board, TU Dortmund University cohort. The seminar, “The Manipulation Machinery”, used collaborative Miro boards so that students could collectively annotate cases and map manipulation techniques as the session progressed.

FIMI aims to interfere with democratic processes and poison public discourse. Some general goals are



Source: own illustrations

Figure 1.3: Exemplary slide from the sessions on strategic influence campaigns, which introduced students to CIB and the ABCDE and DISARM Frameworks. All seminar materials are openly available under adacio.eu/online-course

Download Slides	Download Slides	Download Slides
Module 2.3: “Cognitive Biases” Our brains have systems to support us in processing the mass of information we receive every moment. We'll explore the biases and shortcuts, such as confirmation bias and groupthink, that make us easy targets for manipulation.	Module 2.4: Social Networks and Echo Chamber Dynamics How does false information go viral? This session looks at echo chambers, online networks, and how algorithms and social dynamics amplify what we want to hear.	Module 3.1: Strategic Communications What makes a campaign strategic, and when does it become manipulative? This session unpacks the building blocks of communication campaigns, from public health ads to covert influence operations.
Download Slides	Download Slides	No Slides / See Course Guide
Module 3.2: Tactics, Techniques and Mechanisms From fake profiles to orchestrated viral pushes, in this session we explore the methods behind high-impact manipulation efforts.	Module 3.3: Introducing Frameworks Building on the methods used in manipulation, we look at the analytical frameworks that professionals use to break down and understand complex campaigns.	Module 3.4: Coding Exercise Using The DISARM Framework Bring together your work so far and put theory into practice with this exercise where you will apply structured analysis to real-world examples.

Figure 1.4: Screenshot from the adacio.eu website showing course material free to download. The course, “Introduction to Information Manipulation”, comprises fourteen lessons, twelve slide sets and a glossary, all released under a CC BY-NC 4.0 licence.

3.2. Academia

Annex 2. CeCoR @ ASCoR (University of Amsterdam)

Date: 20 June 2024 **Primary Audience:** Communication scholars **Format:** Guest lecture

Title: Information Operations and the Weaponization of Communication: Introducing FIMI to Strategic Communication Research **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

The project's earliest dissemination activity took place as an invited talk in a series on “Cutting-edge Communication Research” (CeCoR) hosted at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) at the University of Amsterdam, recognised as the number one institution in the world for Communication and Media Studies¹. The series understands itself as a “forum for presenting and discussing research innovations in Communication Science”². The contribution introduced the concept of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) to an audience of communication scholars with a focus on strategic communication and journalism, positioning disinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy narratives as components of a broader pattern of information operations.

The talk presented ADAC.io's aims and connected two analytical instruments used across the project – the ABCDE Framework and the DISARM Framework – to ongoing debates in the field of communication research and opened a discussion on mutual enrichment between FIMI research and the academic disciplines of strategic communication and journalism.

¹

<https://www.uva.nl/shared-content/uva/en/news/news/2026/03/for-the-9th-year-in-a-row-uvas-communication--media-studies-at-no.-1-in-qs-rankings.html>

² <https://ascor.uva.nl/events/cecor/cutting-edge-communication-research-at-ascor.html?cb>



Amsterdam School of Communication Research / ASCoR

- June 20 2024 | Timo Lenk (Institute and School of Journalism at TU Dortmund University) gave the talk 'Information Operations and the Weaponization of Communication: Introducing the Concept of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) to Strategic Communication Research'.

Figure 2.1: Online note on the ADAC.io-related session, CeCoR @ ASCoR contribution (June 2024).
Delivered in the “Cutting-edge Communication Research” series at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research, the talk introduced the concept of FIMI to an audience of strategic-communication and journalism scholars.

Annex 3. PROK 2024, Berlin (Annual conference of the Public Relations and Organisational Communication Division of the German Communication Association)

Date: 31 October 2024 **Primary Audience:** Communication scholars **Format:** Conference talk

Title: Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI): Information Manipulation as a Phenomenon of Political Communication **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

At the annual conference of the Public Relations and Organisational Communication division (PROK) of the German Communication Association (DGPK) in Berlin, the contribution made the case for a shift of analytical attention from the rather narrow term “disinformation” toward the wider category of information manipulation and influence operations. Drawing on a spectrum of manipulation activities and on the concept of post-truth, the talk located state-commissioned manipulation within strategic political communication scholarship.

The contribution reached a German-speaking academic audience specialised in strategic communication research of around 80 participants and helped establish ADAC.io's conceptual vocabulary within the national research community.




Figure 3.1: Presentation at PROK 2024, Berlin. At the conference of the Public Relations and Organisational Communication division of the German Communication Association, the talk made the case for shifting analytical attention from “disinformation” to the wider category of information manipulation.

Annex 4. Colloquium at the Erich-Brost-Institute for International Journalism (EBI)

Date: 9 December 2025 **Primary Audience:** Journalism scholars **Format:** Research colloquium

Title: ADAC.io: Analysing Information Manipulation across Platforms, Culture, Discourse, and AI **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)


The invitation to the research colloquium gave the project a forum to present ADAC.io's overarching approach to an audience of academics dedicated to disinformation and journalism research from countries from the Global South, particularly from Brazil and Mexico. The talk situated information manipulation across the dimensions of platforms, culture, discourse, and AI. The talk connected the project's conceptual foundations with concrete examples from its work.

The colloquium contributed to the project's standing within the international scholarly community and to the dissemination of its analytical perspective. Drawing on the [V-Dem 2025 report](#) and the [3rd EEAS Report on FIMI](#), the talk grounded ADAC.io's definition of FIMI in current evidence and illustrated it with concrete campaigns such as the pro-Beijing Spamouflage network, before introducing the project's case studies and the tools, such as the DISARM Framework, employed in the analysis.



Dr. Timo Lenk
Institute & School
of Journalism

E – Effect: limited evidence; tactics of geographic targeting



By WeaponizingArchitecture - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0,
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=175801425>



By Moldova_location_map.svg:
NordNordWestderivative work: Xfigpower (passt) -
Moldova_location_map.svg, CC BY-SA 3.0,
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9623833>



Figure 4.1: Presentation slide, Erich-Brost-Institute Colloquium (December 2025), applying the ABCDE Framework's "Effect" dimension to the geographic targeting of an influence operation in Moldova. The invited research colloquium at the Erich-Brost-Institute presented ADAC.io's overarching approach to analysing information manipulation campaigns.

Annex 5. Moral Panics, Communication Networks and Polarisation (University of Passau)

Date: 20-21 February 2026 **Primary Audience:** Political science scholars **Format:** Academic workshop panels (two contributions)

Title: *Moral Panics in the Age of Digital Polarisation; and Methodological Perspectives on Studying Information Operations* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

At the two-day academic workshop, organised by the Chair of Development Politics at the Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences, University of Passau and funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, the ADAC.io project contributed to two panels. The first panel on *Discursive Polarisation: Moral Panics in the Age of Digital Polarisation* examined the links between information disorders and societal phenomena such as distrust and affective polarisation, and the increasing convergence of domestic and foreign far right and autocratic actors. The second, a methods workshop, *Studying Moral Panics: Methodological and Conceptual Challenges and Innovations*, addressed methodological and conceptual questions in studying information operations and how they draw on and add to moral panics. Here, the project presented the DISARM Framework to the workshop participants and invited methodological reflection on it.

These contributions connected ADAC.io's empirical work to current debates on polarisation, epistemic integrity, and the functioning of the public sphere, presented to an interdisciplinary and international audience of scholars from the fields of journalism, public diplomacy, and development politics.

International Interdisciplinary Workshop

Moral Panics, Communication Networks and Polarization

Studying Media Logics, Disinformation, and Conflict Lines Across Contexts

Organisation: Chair of Development Politics



20. - 21.02.2026

ITZ, 017 (Innstr. 43)

This international workshop examines moral panics as key mechanisms of polarization across political, cultural, and media contexts, including Germany, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. Bringing together scholars from communication studies, political science, and sociology, the workshop adopts a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective and discusses methodological approaches such as network analysis, discourse analysis, and framing analysis.

Programme:

20 Feb *Conceptual Foundations and Methodological Approaches*

21 Feb *Comparative Perspectives - Media, Politics and Panics across Contexts*

The workshop is part of the research project "Networks, Context, and Media Control – Polarized Discourses in Malaysia and Germany," funded by Bayerische Gleichstellungsförderung (Free State of Bavaria).



Passau International
Centre for Advanced
Interdisciplinary Studies



www.picais.uni-passau.de

picais-office@uni-passau.de

Figure 5.1: Flyer of the workshop “Moral Panics, Communication Networks and Polarisation” (February 2026).

International Workshop: Moral Panics, Communication Networks and Polarization

Workshop - Programme:

**FEB 20,
FRIDAY**

*Conceptual Foundations and
Methodological Approaches*

8.30AM - 9AM Arrival & Coffee

9AM - 10AM Welcome & Introduction*

10AM - 10.45AM Opening Session*:
Moral Panics and Media Logics

*Speakers: Barbara Pasamonik (Maria
Grzegorzewska University), Boris Nieswand
(University of Tübingen)*

11AM - 12.30PM Panel I*

*Discursive Polarisation: Moral Panics in
the Age of Digital Polarization*

*Speakers: Hendrik Meyer (University of Hamburg),
Timo Lenk (University of Dortmund)*

12.30PM - 1.30PM Lunch break

1.30PM - 5.30PM Methods workshop

*Speakers: Laura Behrmann (Bergische Universität
Wuppertal), Daria Kravets-Meinke (Bavarian
Research Institute for Digital Transformation), Timo
Lenk (University of Dortmund), Hendrik Meyer
(University of Hamburg)*



20. - 21.02.2026



ITZ, 017 (Innstr. 43)

Chair of Development Politics

**FEB 21,
SATURDAY**

*Comparative Perspectives –
Media, Politics and Panics
across Contexts*

9AM - 9.30AM Arrival & Coffee

9.30AM - 12PM Panel II*:
Comparative Perspectives -

Media, Politics and Panic across Contexts

*Speakers: David Borukhson (FZI Forschungszentrum
Informatik/Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)),
Salome Kandelaki (New Vision University), Marta
Kozłowska (Universität der Bundeswehr München),
Wolfram Schaffar (University of Passau), Ülker Sözen
(IRGAC, UoP), Gayathry Venkiteswaran (Nottingham
University Malaysia) and Melanie Radue (UoP)*

12PM - 1PM Roundtable Discussion

1PM - 2PM Lunch break

2PM - 3PM Future Research Discussion

3PM - 3.30PM Closing remarks

Registration & Participation



Participation in these sessions () are open to
all interested scholars and students.
Registration is required via QR code.
Attendance will be confirmed by the
workshop coordinator.*

The workshop is part of the research project "Networks, Context, and Media Control – Polarized Discourses in Malaysia and Germany," funded by Bayerische Gleichstellungsförderung (Free State of Bavaria).



Passau International
Centre for Advanced
Interdisciplinary Studies

www.picais.uni-passau.de

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung
für Wissenschaftsförderung



picais-office@uni-passau.de

Figure 5.2: Programme of the workshop “Moral Panics, Communication Networks and Polarisation” (February 2026).

Annex 6. DGPuK annual conference (panel: Journalism in Democratic Society)

Date: 19 March 2026 **Primary Audience:** Communication scholars **Format:** Conference panel contribution

Title: Conceptualising and Analysing Manipulative Communication in the Post-Truth Era **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

At the annual conference of the German Communication Association (DGPuK), the ADAC.io project contributed to a panel on journalism in democratic society. The contribution introduced an interdisciplinary framework for analysing narrative patterns in manipulative communications against the backdrop of post-truth diagnoses and disrupted public spheres, and showed results from ADAC.io case studies, demonstrating the narrative framework’s potential to identify cross-case narrative patterns alongside behavioural patterns that are covered in the DISARM Framework.

The talk contributed ADAC.io’s analytical perspective on FIMI to a discussion on the implications of disinformation for journalism and democratic deliberation, reaching the core of the German-speaking communication-studies community.

Prevalence and dangers of online mis- and disinformation

- Relative share of misinformation in information consumption of average population rather small (Budak et al. 2024)
- High exposure to misinformation in radical and fringe groups and occasional extreme effects such as hate crimes and civil unrest
- Influential political actors seek to shape news coverage and reach larger audiences with disinformation (Budak et al. 2024)
- Certain groups and regions are more susceptible to manipulative narratives (Rodríguez-Pose 2018)



Figure 6.1: Presentation slide, DGPuK panel (March 2026), setting out the current state of disinformation research to discuss foreign interference, manipulation patterns, and ADAC.io case-study results. Presented within a panel on journalism in democratic society at the annual conference of the German Communication Association (DGPuK).

3.3. Journalists

Annex 7. Online workshop: Introduction to FIMI and DISARM

Date: 18 March 2025 **Primary Audience:** Investigative journalists and fact-checkers **Format:** Interactive online workshop

Title: Information Manipulation Workshop – Introduction to FIMI and DISARM **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) & Julian Neylan (DISARM Foundation / Alliance4Europe)

This online workshop brought together journalists, fact-checkers, and researchers for a hands-on introduction to FIMI and the DISARM Framework. 20 participants were confirmed, drawn from organisations including VERA Files, The Ferret, Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (rbb), Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the University of Helsinki and several freelance newsrooms.

Co-delivered by the DISARM Foundation and TU Dortmund University, the session combined a conceptual introduction to information manipulation with a practical walk-through of how the DISARM Framework supports standardised, shareable analysis across the defender community. On the conceptual side, participants worked through the EEAS definition of FIMI, and the disinformation tactics captured in the “5D” typology, with concrete illustrations, including the spin put on Japan’s 2023 discharge of treated Fukushima water, and ADAC.io’s case study on the 2024 European elections, before moving on to OSINT research and the DISARM taxonomy.

What is a taxonomy?

- Terms are used to tag, index, or categorize content to make it easier to be found and retrieved
- The taxonomy links the user to the desired content

Content ↔ Taxonomy ↔ Users

tu dortmund university ADAC.io DISARM FRAMEWORK 30

Figure 7.1: Live online workshop, 18 March 2025, presenting the DISARM Framework’s taxonomy to participating journalists and fact-checkers. The joint ADAC.io and DISARM Foundation workshop introduced twenty journalists and fact-checkers to FIMI, open-source investigation, and the DISARM Framework’s taxonomy through a worked case study.



Figure 7.2: Live online workshop, 18 March 2025. Participants joined from an international cross-section of newsrooms and fact-checking organisations, including VERA Files, The Ferret, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (rbb).


Annex 8. SciCAR 2025 (Science + Computer-Assisted Reporting conference)

Date: 5 September 2025 **Primary Audience:** Investigative and data journalists **Format:** Interactive in-person workshop

Title: *Data Traces of Disinformation: FIMI and the Analytical Frameworks of the Defender Community* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) & Julian Neylan (DISARM Foundation / Alliance4Europe)

At SciCAR – a conference bringing together science journalism (Sci) and computer-assisted reporting (CAR) – the project ran an interactive workshop on how (foreign) information manipulation takes shape and how analytical frameworks from the defender community help newsrooms recognise and categorise manipulation techniques that go beyond simple factual inaccuracy.

Co-delivered by Alliance4Europe and TU Dortmund University, the workshop walked the audience through the DISARM Navigator and OpenCTI. Its central point was that two lines of work belong together when investigating a manipulation campaign: checking the truth of claims and unpacking their narratives, as well as pinning down the techniques, behavioural patterns, and technical means that are employed to carry them.



SciCAR

[Schedule](#) [Sessions](#) [Speakers](#) [English](#) [Deutsch](#) • [login](#)

Data traces of disinformation: FIMI and the analytical frameworks of the defender community

2025-09-05 13:30–14:30, Room 3 (by the kitchen)
Language: English

Forms of information manipulation, such as disinformation and manipulative narratives, pose a threat to free discourse in democratic societies. Beyond verifying factual accuracy, newsrooms must also be able to identify and categorize a wider range of manipulation techniques in order to uphold journalistic quality and inform the public about such phenomena.

In this interactive workshop, Julian Neylan (Alliance4Europe) and Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund) explore how (foreign) information manipulation takes shape and introduce practical analytical frameworks from the defender community for recognizing and countering these techniques.

Disarm-Framework: <https://disarmfoundation.github.io/disarm-navigator/>
OpenCTI: <https://filigran.io/solutions/open-cti/>

Dr. Timo Lenk

Timo Lenk is a researcher at the Institute and School of Journalism at TU Dortmund University, working on a European project on strategic information manipulation. He earned his PhD in Communication Studies at the University of Greifswald, where he also taught in the Master's program in Organizational Communication. His work focuses on information manipulation, strategic narratives, and interdisciplinary approaches to communication research.

Julian Neylan

Julian Neylan works with DISARM as a trainings developer and in further developing the frameworks. He previously developed media literacy tools and has several research publications on online influence in outlets like Nature and World Medical & Health Policy.

Figure 8.1 From the [conference website](#), SciCAR 2025 workshop. At this conference bridging science journalism and computer-assisted reporting, the hands-on workshop showed investigative and data journalists how the DISARM taxonomy and OpenCTI support the structured analysis of manipulation campaigns.

3.4. Fact-checkers

Annex 9. Online workshop: How AI Shapes FIMI (TU Dortmund University & Debunk.org)

Date: 27 November 2025 **Primary Audience:** Mixed, with an emphasis on fact-checkers **Format:** Interactive online workshop

Title: *How AI Shapes FIMI* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) & Milan Jovanović (Debunk.org)

This 90-minute online workshop, jointly delivered by TU Dortmund University and ADAC.io partner Debunk.org, explored the role of AI in information-manipulation campaigns, both in content creation through generative AI and in its dissemination and amplification, and surveyed tools for detecting AI-generated content. It responded directly to a reviewer recommendation from ADAC.io's first reporting period to integrate AI perspectives into ADAC.io's outputs.

Of 140 registrations, 65 took part live (a 46% attendance rate), joining from 18 countries across four continents, among them Lithuania, Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Ethiopia, Turkey, Finland, Ireland, the UK and the US. The programme traced how manipulation tactics have shifted from labour-intensive, pre-AI methods to generative-AI campaigns. To illustrate what this looks like in practice, the presentation drew on real-world cases such as Operation Overload and the Pravda network, and used interactive quizzes to let participants put each concept into practice.





Figure 9.1: LinkedIn advertising, “How AI Shapes FIMI” workshop. Jointly delivered by TU Dortmund University and Debunk.org on 27 November 2025, the 90-minute session drew 140 registrations and 65 live participants from across four continents.

Agenda

	Introduction
1.	Short Overview of the ADAC.io Project
2.	Why FIMI + AI is Timely and Relevant
3.	Historical / Pre-AI Methods
4.	How Generative AI / LLMs Change the Game
5.	What tools we use as FIMI analysts?
6.	Conclusions and Takeaways



INTRODUCTION |



After Completing This Part, You Will:

- Recognize the **evolution of disinformation tactics**, from pre-AI methods to generative AI-enabled campaigns.
- Identify how **AI and LLMs** are leveraged in **real-world FIMI operations**.
- **Recognize** why FIMI + AI is a **growing challenge**, and how scale, speed, and personalization change the threat landscape
- Analyse **case studies** of AI-enabled campaigns (e.g., Operation Overload, Pravda Network).
- Strengthen your critical thinking through **interactive questions** and short **exercises** on AI-generated manipulation.



Figures 9.2 and 9.3 Workshop content: the changing threat landscape at the intersection of FIMI and AI.




Figure 9.4: Live session engagement, 27 November 2025. Interactive quizzes ran throughout the workshop, letting participants apply each concept, from AI-enabled disinformation tactics to detection tools, in real time.

Annex 10. DISARM for Fact-checkers – Workshop (session 1)

Date: 29 January 2026 **Primary Audience:** Fact-checkers **Format:** Interactive online workshop


Title: *DISARM for Fact-checkers: An Introductory Workshop (v1.7)* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) & Adam Maunder (DISARM Foundation / Alliance4Europe)

This online workshop introduced version 1.7 of the DISARM Framework, the dedicated fact-checker version developed within ADAC.io, to a focused audience of fact-checkers and researchers. Promoted through the project's channels as a free, 90-minute session, it walked participants through how fact-checkers benefit from the customised framework, how DISARM supports interoperable disinformation analysis, and how to integrate the fact-checker version into existing workflows.

The agenda combined an introduction to ADAC.io and FIMI with DISARM theory, a rationale for using DISARM, a presentation of the v1.7 update, and hands-on exercises with structured feedback. The workshop was designed to be highly interactive in order to gather expert feedback to further refine the Framework in an iterative process.



Figure 10.1: LinkedIn advertising for the first of two “DISARM for fact-checkers” workshop. Hosted by the DISARM Foundation, Alliance4Europe and TU Dortmund University, this free online session introduced the dedicated fact-checker version (v1.7) of the DISARM Framework.

A red rectangular box on the left side of the slide, containing the word "Agenda" in white text.

Agenda

1. Brief round of introductions (name & organisation)
2. Introduction to the ADAC.io Project
3. FIMI (or why interoperability is so important)
4. DISARM Theory
5. Why use DISARM?
6. DISARM v1.7
7. Exercises & Feedback

DISARM FOUNDATION

ADAC.io
Adaptive Data Access
Interoperability

tu dortmund
university

Co-funded by the
European Union

Figure 10.2: Workshop agenda. The session moved from an introduction to ADAC.io and FIMI, through DISARM theory and the rationale for the Framework, to the v1.7 update and hands-on exercises with structured feedback.




Figure 10.3: Live session engagement, 29 January 2026. The first session gathered a focused group of fact-checkers and researchers, whose technique-level feedback fed directly into refining the v1.7 Framework.

Annex 11. DISARM for Fact-checkers – Workshop (session 2)

Date: 28 April 2026 **Primary Audience:** Fact-checkers **Format:** Interactive online workshop

Title: *DISARM for Fact-checkers: An Introductory Workshop (v1.7) – second session* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) & Adam Maunder (DISARM Foundation / Alliance4Europe)

A second session of the DISARM for Fact-checkers workshop was held to reach a wider audience and to give those unable to attend the January session an opportunity to participate. It repeated the interactive introduction to the v1.7 fact-checker framework, again gathering expert feedback on technique definitions.

Holding two sessions reflects the project's intention to build a durable relationship with the fact-checking community rather than a one-off training, and to keep refining the Framework against practitioner input.



Figure 11.1: LinkedIn advertising for the second “DISARM for fact-checkers” workshop. A second session was held on 28 April 2026 to reach a wider audience and to give those unable to attend the January session a further opportunity to take part.




Figure 11.2: Live session engagement, 28 April 2026. Participants were drawn from fact-checking organisations and OSINT communities across Europe, Asia and beyond, including Maldita.es, FactWatch, and the IFCN.




Figure 11.3: Participants screenshot at the end of the workshop, 28 April 2026. The compact group size of 15-20 participants was a deliberate feature, allowing genuine dialogue and detailed feedback on the Framework's fact-checker techniques.

3.5. Public institutions and policymakers

Annex 12. SAUFEX podcast

Date: 19 September 2025 **Primary Audience:** Policy actors and interested publics **Format:** Podcast episode

Title: *Science Communication and the Analysis of Information Manipulation* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

ADAC.io was featured on an episode of the SAUFEX podcast, produced by the EU-funded sister initiative of the same name. Drawing on a communication-research perspective, the conversation set out how information disorders can be understood and tackled at the level of society, attending to their social, technological, political, and cultural dimensions.

The appearance broadened ADAC.io's reach to the audiences of its sister projects and is publicly available as a recorded episode.




Figure 12.1: [Listen to the episode \(SoundCloud\)](#). On this episode of the EU-funded SAUFEX podcast, the project drew on a communication-research perspective to unpack the social, technical, political and cultural factors that shape information disorders.

Annex 13. Cybersecurity & Disinformation Conference / “Länderübergreifende Plattform Cybersicherheitsforschung” (“Inter-regional Platform for Cybersecurity Research”) North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)

Date: 27 October 2025 **Primary Audience:** State agencies and state interior ministries **Format:** Conference talk

Title: *Techniques and Patterns of Digital Information Manipulation* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

Hosted by the Ministry of the Interior of North Rhine-Westphalia, this event was designed to foster dialogue between disinformation and cybersecurity experts, and state agencies and state

interior ministries. ADAC.io contributed a talk on the techniques and patterns of digital information manipulation, sharing the stage with speakers from the German Cyberagentur, the BSI, CORRECTIV, Fraunhofer FKIE, and CAIS.

The contribution positioned FIMI analysis within the cybersecurity policy community, underlining the shared logic of tactics, techniques and procedures across the two fields that are both relevant to foster our understanding of hybrid threats.

Figure 13.1: Cyber Con NRW. The flyer reads “Save the Date: Inter-regional Platform for Cybersecurity Research 2025. We are delighted to invite you to the fourth LPC! Building on the Hessian initiative launched in 2021, the Inter-regional Platform for Cybersecurity Research (LPC) once again creates space this year for lively exchange, fresh impulses, and intensive networking between academia and state representatives – focused on current topics in cybersecurity research. The LPC offers the chance to share perspectives, develop ideas further, and look ahead together. Our focus topic for 2025: ‘Cybersecurity and Disinformation.’ When? 27-28 October 2025. Where? Ministry of the Interior of the State of NRW.” (October 2025)

Operation Overload
Undermining Support for Ukraine
([CheckFirst](#), 2025)

The slide illustrates the 'Operation Overload' campaign as a worked example of digital information manipulation. It features a central graphic with the text 'AKE FAKE FAKE FA' in large red letters. Above the graphic, text describes a video branded with the BBC logo claiming that First Lady Olena Zelenska had attempted to flee Ukraine, first seeded on Telegram on April 3 and then propagated on X. Below the graphic, three columns of text provide context: the video was directly posted by a verified Kremlin-aligned influencer account (@peacemaket71, 41,000 followers) on April 4, which gained over 410,000 views; the Ukrainian president's wife has been planning her escape for six months; and following the media scandal, Olena Zelenska's social media accounts experienced an unprecedented spike in activity. At the bottom, a concluding sentence states that what began as a single social media post by a pro-Kremlin account rapidly escalated into a global narrative spanning across countries and continents.

Dr. Timo Lenk Institute & School of Journalism

15/06/2026 16

Figure 13.2: Conference presentation slide, Cyber Con NRW (October 2025), illustrating the “Operation Overload” campaign as a worked example of how an initial manipulative post can be propelled into a cross-border narrative. Convened under the Ministry of the Interior of North Rhine-Westphalia, the conference brought together cybersecurity and disinformation experts; ADAC.io's talk traced the techniques and patterns of digital information manipulation.

Annex 14. DisinfoCon Berlin 2025

Date: 11 November 2025 **Primary Audience:** Civil society organisations and policy actors **Format:** Conference panel contribution

Title: *Information Resilience: Connecting Practitioners Across Sectors* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

DisinfoCon Berlin, organised by ADAC.io partner Alliance4Europe together with Democracy Reporting International, hosted a panel on information resilience to which the project contributed. Moderated by Saman Nazari (Alliance4Europe), the panel on collaborative defence brought Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) together with Charles Terroille (Science Feedback), Max Bernhard (CORRECTIV) and Lea Frühwirth (CeMAS). The discussion addressed how the work of civil society organisations, media, academia and government can be connected into a coordinated response to democratic threats, what barriers stand in the way – including risks posed by threat actors – and which shared infrastructures and processes are needed for a sustainable, whole-of-society defence.

The exchange surfaced recurring themes that run through the project's engagement work: the need to align terminology (interoperability), to balance short-term fact-checking against long-term resilience-building (requiring curated exchange structures), and to design collaboration around clear, shared goals (e.g. election monitoring and disruption of interference).



Figure 14.1: Event invitation for DisinfoCon Berlin 2025, organised by ADAC.io partner Alliance4Europe and Democracy Reporting International, where the project joined a panel on collaborative, whole-of-society defence against information manipulation.



Figure 14.2: Impressions from the event: panel discussion on information resilience, with Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University) alongside panellists from Science Feedback, CORRECTIV and CeMAS, moderated by Alliance4Europe.



Figure 14.3: Impressions from the event: in-depth discussion of how civil society, media, academia, and government institutions can connect their work into a coordinated response, and the barriers and shared infrastructure that such collaboration requires.

Annex 15. First German workshop on detecting and addressing misinformation (MPI Berlin)

Title: *First German Workshop on Detecting and Addressing Misinformation for Media and Communication Practitioners* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

Around forty registered stakeholders took part, spanning public-health and environmental agencies (Robert Koch Institute, Umweltbundesamt, BZgA), major newsrooms (DER SPIEGEL, DIE ZEIT, Deutschlandradio, WDR, MDR) and research institutions.

Source: DISARM Foundation

The flowchart illustrates the DISARM Foundation's information strategy, organized into 14 columns representing different stages of the process:

- Plan Strategy (3 techniques):**
 - Strategic Planning
 - Strategic Analysis
 - Strategic Advantages
- Plan Objectives (11 techniques):**
 - Define
 - Identify
 - Identify Data Needs
 - Identify Data Sources
 - Identify Existing Resources
 - Identify Existing Issues
 - Identify Existing Problems
 - Identify Existing Solutions
 - Identify Existing Challenges
 - Identify Existing Opportunities
 - Identify Existing Threats
- Target Audience (2 techniques):**
 - Identify Target Audience
 - Identify Target Audience Segments
- Develop Narratives (7 techniques):**
 - Develop Narrative
 - Develop Narrative Themes
 - Develop Narrative Structure
 - Develop Narrative Content
 - Develop Narrative Style
 - Develop Narrative Tone
 - Develop Narrative Voice
- Develop Content (4 techniques):**
 - Create Content
 - Create Content Assets
 - Create Content Assets
 - Create Content Assets
- Establish Assets (5 techniques):**
 - Establish Asset
 - Establish Asset
 - Establish Asset
 - Establish Asset
 - Establish Asset
- Microtarget (1 technique):**
 - Microtarget
- Select Channels and Platforms (10 techniques):**
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
 - Select Channel
- Conduct Prep (5 techniques):**
 - Conduct Prep
 - Conduct Prep
 - Conduct Prep
 - Conduct Prep
 - Conduct Prep
- Deliver Content (4 techniques):**
 - Deliver Content
 - Deliver Content
 - Deliver Content
 - Deliver Content
- Maximize Exposure (5 techniques):**
 - Maximize Exposure
 - Maximize Exposure
 - Maximize Exposure
 - Maximize Exposure
 - Maximize Exposure
- Drive Online (5 techniques):**
 - Drive Online
 - Drive Online
 - Drive Online
 - Drive Online
 - Drive Online
- Drive Offline (5 techniques):**
 - Drive Offline
 - Drive Offline
 - Drive Offline
 - Drive Offline
 - Drive Offline
- Persist in the Information Environment (4 techniques):**
 - Persist in the Information Environment
 - Persist in the Information Environment
 - Persist in the Information Environment
 - Persist in the Information Environment
- Assess Effectiveness (3 techniques):**
 - Assess Effectiveness
 - Assess Effectiveness
 - Assess Effectiveness

Arrows indicate the flow of information between these stages, showing a highly interconnected and multi-path process.

51

3.7. Business

Annex 16. SWF Forum 2025

Date: 22 May 2025 **Primary Audience:** Business consultants **Format:** Keynote impulse and panel discussion

Title: *What Is Still True? Disinformation in the Age of AI* **Presenter / lead on behalf of ADAC.io:** Timo Lenk (TU Dortmund University)

Delivered as an impulse talk to a business and professional audience and an in-depth discussion of the potentials of the DISARM Framework for threat analysis in the corporate domain, this contribution examined the interface between artificial intelligence and disinformation. It set two angles side by side: on the one hand, manipulation that works by shaping the data feeding AI systems (input perspective), and on the other, the use of generative AI to produce manipulative material, e.g., deepfake images and videos, for social media at scale (output perspective).

The talk translated the project's research on AI-enabled information manipulation for a non-specialist professional audience, illustrating concrete cases of AI-supported manipulation and what organisations can do in response.



Figure 16.1: image from website: Event flyer. The header reads “The 11th SWF Annual Forum 2025 – Communication and AI.” At this forum for organisational consultants and communication professionals, the impulse talk “What Is Still True? Disinformation in the Age of AI” examined how AI is used both to manipulate the data underlying AI systems and to mass-produce manipulative content.




Figure 16.2: Picture from the event: presenting the DISARM Framework to an audience of organisational consultants as part of a discussion of the dangers of foreign information manipulation for (large) corporations.

Acknowledgement of funding

This work was funded by the European Union Horizon Europe research and innovation programme [grant number 101132444 – ADAC.io] and by UKRI under the UK government's Horizon Europe funding guarantee [grant number 10105669]. Views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission or UKRI. Neither the European Commission nor UKRI can be held responsible for them.

ADAC.io Publication – Deliverable 4.1 | Contact: timo.lenk@tu-dortmund.de | adacio.eu

31.07 2026



ADAC.io Publication

Date of Publication: 31.07.2026

Contact: timo.lenk@tu-dortmund.de

See more at adacio.eu

Funded by the European Union Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Program and the UKRI under the UK government's Horizon Europe funding guarantee. Views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union, the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Program or UKRI. Neither the European Union, the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Program, nor the UKRI can be held responsible for them.



**Co-funded by
the European Union**