

# FIMI IDENTIFICATION, ATTRIBUTION, PERCEIVED GOALS AND CONSEQUENCES

**Public opinion survey research**

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**FIMI in Poland, Sweden and Lithuania: Identification, attribution,  
perceived goals and consequences.  
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## Contents:

Introduction .....	4
Research plan.....	4
Cases of FIMI disinformation: identification, attribution and goals .....	5
Overall impact .....	5
Analysis of individual items.....	7
Application of the DISARM Red framework .....	19
Consequences and counteraction .....	24
Conclusions .....	26
ANNEX .....	27
ADAC Questionnaire .....	27
Items .....	34

## Introduction

A key area in the field of disinformation research is determining the structure and content of FIMI messages, which makes them convincing for recipients. In previous reports and studies developed within the ADACio framework, FIMI cases were catalogued and a typology was created using the DISARM framework. Currently, as part of an empirical quantitative study, we have determined which attributes contribute to increasing the effective power of content aimed at manipulating and misleading recipients. We are particularly interested in factors such as: the content of the message, the origin, as well as the framing of the message. The study also focused on consequences of FIMI disinformation and preferred methods of counteracting. The attribution of materials was a key element of the study. We evaluated the selected FIMI items with reference to dimensions of disinformation commonly mentioned in literature: falsehood, an attempt at manipulation, an expression of interests (of FIMI creator), being based on hearsay, beliefs or myths, unreliability, emotionality, a trigger of action.

## Research plan

The team conducted the study on samples representative of the residents of Poland, Sweden and Lithuania.

The procedure was as follows:

1. Selection of the appropriate language (Polish, Swedish, Lithuanian).
2. Within each sample (country) each respondent was randomly assigned four items out of eight, in random order. The display of the item was followed by a block of questions related to the content.
3. Finally, a block of questions was asked to all respondents (full national samples).

The total number of respondents was:

Poland: N=1534

Sweden: N=1553

Lithuania: N=1534

The questionnaire and items are included in the Annex. The study was conducted by the company Pollster in December 2025-January 2026. Interviews were conducted using the CAWI method.

## Cases of FIMI disinformation: identification, attribution and goals

Items were selected from the database of 500 FIMI cases collected in the framework of the ADAC project. The following criteria were used to select the items:

1. Relevance for respondents, understood as either events related directly to those three societies, or global/universal;
2. Sufficient description to enable the determination of the extent of the manipulation.

## Overall impact

A series of analogous questions were asked about each item. They concerned 13 dimensions of disinformation: falsehood, an attempt at manipulation, an expression of interests (of FIMI creator), being based on hearsay, beliefs or myths, unreliability, emotionality, a trigger of action. The questions were asked partially on inverted scales to verify the consistency of the answers.

**Table 1. Evaluation.**

Item number (means)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
a. Truth	2,01	3,10	2,57	3,00	3,40	1,27	4,47	3,07
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,31	6,83	6,83	7,09	6,74	6,62	5,83	7,02
c. Emotional effect	3,00	2,99	3,41	3,46	3,44	3,06	4,26	3,56
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	2,58	3,02	2,71	2,95	3,20	2,24	4,09	3,29
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,28	2,47	2,49	2,58	2,77	2,07	3,19	2,60
f. Change attitudes (others)	5,15	5,51	5,02	5,52	5,68	4,27	5,98	5,91
g. Encouragement to act (others)	5,08	5,29	4,94	5,33	5,75	4,21	5,80	5,58
h. Reliability	2,51	3,28	3,13	3,26	3,38	1,94	4,33	3,28
i. Good faith	2,24	2,85	3,12	2,79	2,92	1,87	4,09	2,76
j. Expression of group interests	6,31	6,45	5,94	6,52	6,46	4,17	6,26	6,60
k. Based on facts	2,14	3,07	2,66	3,07	3,31	1,56	4,43	3,08
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	6,36	6,04	5,67	6,07	5,86	5,61	5,33	6,23
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,13	3,65	3,67	3,82	3,71	2,61	4,65	3,40
N=	2309	2313	2312	2315	2319	2308	2298	2306

DATA FOR ALL THREE COUNTRIES

The first conclusion from the study is: the societies analysed are largely resistant to disinformation. The content is correctly recognized as an attempt to mislead. The midpoint of the scale is 5. In each dimension, the average indicates correct recognition of the nature and

purpose of the disinformation material. In the case of all materials, the prevailing opinion is that they are: an attempt at manipulation, an expression of interests (with one exception), and that they are based on hearsay, beliefs or myths (averages above 5). At the same time, they are not perceived as true, based on facts, verifiable, prepared reliably, or prepared with good intention; they do not move respondents personally or personal encouragement to act (averages below 5). However, most items were seen as potentially encouraging other people to change views and take actions.

The highest scores as far as perceived truth is concerned, and the lowest perceived manipulation are associated with Item 7, which is framed in quasi-journalistic style. The item is related to the political situation in the Middle East. The lowest perceived truth, reliability, good faith, factuality and accountability are recorded for item 6, which is apolitical. The highest scores on the manipulation metric are recorded by items 1, 4 and 8. All three pertain to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and portray the Ukrainian leadership in negative context.

In order to reduce the data, we prepared a synthetic indicator (summary index) of susceptibility to disinformation, based on the degree to which the material was perceived as manipulative, untrue and misleading. Higher index values indicate a higher degree of belief that the content is truthful, well-intentioned, verifiable and fact-based, and higher emotional and behavioural response. On the other hand, higher values of the index indicate a lower degree of belief that it serves group interests, is manipulative and is based on superstitions or falsehoods. We included: higher values for a, c, d, e, f, g, i, and lower values for: b, j, l. We calculated the averages for all items. Higher values on the index indicate higher effectiveness of FIMI disinformation.

The overall susceptibility in Sweden is slightly higher than in Poland and Lithuania. Tukey's post hoc test shows that differences between Sweden and both Poland ( $p < 0,001$ ) and Lithuania ( $p < 0,001$ ) are significant, while the differences in means between Poland and Lithuania is not significant ( $p < 0,864$ ).

**Table 2. Overall susceptibility to FIMI disinformation**

	Mean	N	SD
Poland	3,4443	1534	1,16824
Sweden	3,7331	1553	1,33372
Lithuania	3,4683	1534	1,35884

Total	3,5493	4621	1,29626
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Earlier research shows that media consumption patterns may influence susceptibility to disinformation. In a multivariate analysis we determined whether the selection of news sources has a net influence on the identification of FIMI. The models were controlled for socio-demographics: gender, age and education.

In the models for the three countries, age is significant in all three: older people are better able to identify the cases of FIMI.

As regards sources of information, the use of online information platforms proved to be a factor reducing susceptibility to disinformation in Poland, Sweden and Lithuania. The use of social media increased vulnerability, but only in Sweden.

**Table 3. Determinants of susceptibility to FIMI disinformation**

	PL		SE		LT	
	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Socio-demographics						
Gender (1=m)	-0,041	0,107	0,050	0,037	0,000	0,996
Age	-0,149	0,000	-0,302	0,000	-0,266	0,000
Education (1=tertiary)	-0,031	0,226	-0,053	0,026	-0,129	0,000
Sources of information						
TV	0,010	0,706	-0,065	0,010	-0,030	0,229
Radio	-0,041	0,120	0,020	0,421	-0,057	0,025
Online information platforms	-0,094	0,000	-0,108	0,000	-0,103	0,000
Print media	0,057	0,026	-0,014	0,555	0,056	0,021
Social media	0,059	0,025	0,067	0,009	0,062	0,012
Friends and family	0,078	0,002	0,029	0,227	-0,008	0,755
R sq.						
	0,061		0,147		0,160	

### Analysis of individual items

In the following section, the impact of individual items is discussed. Country scores are presented and the differences between Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian society are discussed.

#### Item 1

The situation concerns a quote circulating on the Internet attributed to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he allegedly stated that Ukraine wants to join the USA instead of Texas. The quote appeared in a screenshot presented as an article from the Ukrainian news service TCH and was shared by Facebook users and some Russian-language websites that cited journalist Maksym Zhuravel as the author. However, this phrasing does not appear in Zhuravel's published texts. The original TCH article from January 25 summarizes Zelensky's speech without any reference to Texas or joining the United States in this manner.

Item 1 was rated as unreliable in all three countries, with Swedish respondents rating it slightly higher on the truth metric. It scores high with regard to perceived manipulation. The item has a score above 5 (the middle point) with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group (presumably hostile to Ukraine). Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored lowest in Poland.

**Table 4. Evaluation. Item 1**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	1,59	2,48	1,96
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,88	6,85	7,22
c. Emotional effect	3,37	3,11	2,53
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	2,57	3,02	2,16
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,06	2,60	2,18
f. Change attitudes (others)	4,91	5,34	5,21
g. Encouragement to act (others)	4,84	5,21	5,19
h. Reliability	2,11	3,17	2,23
i. Good faith	1,69	2,83	2,18
j. Expression of group interests	6,54	6,03	6,37
k. Based on facts	1,77	2,47	2,17
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	6,05	6,44	6,59
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,15	3,42	2,80
N=	764	778	767

The origin of the item was linked to Russia by pluralities in all three countries, in Sweden slightly less often than in Poland and Lithuania. Relatively commonly, it was believed to be created by internet trolls. Ukraine was rarely mentioned in this context, which indicates correct recognition as false attribution contained in the material.

**Table 5. Attribution. Item 1**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	1,2%	1,6%	0,5%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	2,9%	3,2%	5,5%
Alternative media / niche portals	9,1%	12,1%	8,4%
Social media users	14,1%	16,8%	9,9%
Internet trolls / bots	38,6%	27,4%	33,2%
Interest groups / lobbyists	9,5%	11,1%	10,9%

Scientists / experts	0,4%	0,5%	2,5%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	1,2%	2,6%	3,0%
Special services	7,9%	2,1%	11,9%
Owners of social media platforms	3,3%	3,7%	6,4%
Russia	49,8%	38,9%	47,5%
Ukraine	7,5%	7,4%	8,9%
USA	2,1%	10,5%	6,4%
European Union	0,8%	1,1%	1,5%
Israel	2,1%	2,1%	0,5%
Other country	0,8%	3,2%	2,5%

Manipulation of public opinion was the most commonly indicated goal of this FIMI item. Substantial minorities in Poland and Sweden suspected a profit motive.

**Table 6. Goals of FIMI. Item 1**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	2,1%	7,9%	7,9%
To manipulate public opinion	53,5%	40,8%	49,5%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	18,7%	20,9%	13,4%
Satire or joke	9,5%	11,0%	7,4%
To express a personal opinion	2,1%	4,7%	5,9%
To serve political interests	14,1%	14,7%	15,8%

## Item 2

The situation pertains to claims that Alexander Soros, son of George Soros, received 400 km<sup>2</sup> of land from Ukrainian authorities for hazardous waste storage. Russian-language Facebook accounts and Russian media spread these claims, citing an alleged agreement between Soros and Andrii Yermak, head of President Volodymyr Zelensky's office. A document purportedly confirming this agreement was allegedly obtained by French journalist Jules Vincent and posted on social media platform X. No corresponding document can be found on the official website of the President of Ukraine, and Ukrainian law restricts the acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners.

Item 2 was also rated as false in all three countries. It scores high with regard to perceived manipulation. This perception is especially strong in Poland. The item has a score above 5 (the middle point) with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group. Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored low. It scores above 5 on its possibility to change others' attitudes and actions.

**Table 7. Evaluation. Item 2**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	2,80	3,20	3,29
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,11	6,74	6,65
c. Emotional effect	3,39	3,11	2,46
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	2,90	3,36	2,80

e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,19	2,83	2,38
f. Change attitudes (others)	5,28	5,70	5,54
g. Encouragement to act (others)	5,18	5,38	5,30
h. Reliability	2,90	3,59	3,35
i. Good faith	2,33	3,24	2,99
j. Expression of group interests	6,68	6,29	6,37
k. Based on facts	2,78	3,24	3,20
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	5,64	6,13	6,35
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,58	3,79	3,58
N=	769	776	768

Item 2 was (correctly) perceived by most respondents as originating in Russia. In Poland it was also relatively commonly seen as work of online trolls or bots. Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive.

**Table 8. Attribution. Item 2**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	2,4%	3,2%	3,5%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	7,2%	3,2%	6,9%
Alternative media / niche portals	4,8%	7,7%	6,4%
Social media users	14,4%	12,3%	8,9%
Internet trolls / bots	31,7%	14,8%	19,8%
Interest groups / lobbyists	11,4%	17,4%	17,3%
Scientists / experts	0,6%	1,3%	1,5%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	1,8%	1,9%	2,5%
Special services	7,2%	8,4%	13,9%
Owners of social media platforms	3,0%	5,8%	5,4%
Russia	47,9%	52,9%	54,5%
Ukraine	4,8%	11,0%	8,9%
USA	3,0%	2,6%	2,5%
European Union	1,2%	1,9%	1,5%
Israel	3,6%	1,3%	0,5%
Other country	1,2%	2,6%	0,5%

Manipulation of public opinion was the most commonly indicated perceived goal of this FIMI item. Secondly, it was considered as a vehicle for political interest.

**Table 9. Goals of FIMI. Item 2**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	8,4%	9,0%	7,9%
To manipulate public opinion	51,5%	47,7%	45,0%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	12,6%	10,3%	12,9%
Satire or joke	0,6%	2,6%	1,0%
To express a personal opinion	4,2%	4,5%	10,9%
To serve political interests	22,8%	25,8%	22,3%

### Item 3

The incident concerns a photo of graffiti depicting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which circulated on the Internet in a widely modified form. In the version shared on social media, both leaders are shown with their hands joined, suggesting a specific kind of relationship between them.

Item 3 was also rated as false in all three countries. It scores high with regard to perceived manipulation. This perception is especially strong in Poland. The item has a score above 5 (the middle point) with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group. Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored low. In Sweden and Lithuania, though not in Poland, it scores above 5 on its possibility to change others' attitudes and actions.

**Table 10. Evaluation. Item 3**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	1,92	2,95	2,82
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,36	6,45	6,67
c. Emotional effect	3,53	3,60	3,11
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	2,43	3,14	2,55
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	1,98	2,84	2,64
f. Change attitudes (others)	4,73	5,21	5,13
g. Encouragement to act (others)	4,66	5,11	5,06
h. Reliability	2,50	3,74	3,13
i. Good faith	2,32	3,58	3,45
j. Expression of group interests	6,07	5,85	5,90
k. Based on facts	2,03	2,99	2,95
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	5,31	5,79	5,92
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,07	3,84	4,10
N=	768	777	767

Polish public opinion differs from Swedish and Lithuanian in case of this item. In Poland, the origin was most commonly identified as internet trolls or social media users, with Russia as the third most common response. In Sweden and Lithuania it was usually attributed to Russia or online trolls.

**Table 11. Attribution. Item 3**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	1,0%	5,2%	2,2%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	5,6%	4,3%	3,9%
Alternative media / niche portals	10,8%	14,2%	12,9%
Social media users	32,3%	19,0%	15,8%
Internet trolls / bots	42,6%	22,9%	31,2%
Interest groups / lobbyists	14,4%	16,2%	16,4%
Scientists / experts	1,0%	1,6%	1,1%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	2,1%	2,4%	1,1%
Special services	5,1%	4,0%	4,3%

Owners of social media platforms	5,1%	6,7%	7,5%
Russia	21,5%	27,0%	27,1%
Ukraine	3,1%	6,0%	4,6%
USA	2,6%	7,1%	3,9%
European Union	1,0%	3,2%	1,1%
Israel	1,0%	3,2%	2,2%
Other country	0,5%	2,8%	4,3%

Polish public opinion differs from Swedish and Lithuanian also with regard to the perceived goals. In Poland, the most common answer is manipulation of public opinion. In Sweden and Lithuania manipulation was mentioned as well, but it was more commonly than in Poland seen as a joke.

**Table 12. Goals of FIMI. Item 3**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	1,5%	5,5%	4,6%
To manipulate public opinion	40,0%	28,5%	26,8%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	17,9%	13,4%	13,2%
Satire or joke	14,9%	24,9%	25,0%
To express a personal opinion	16,4%	15,4%	22,9%
To serve political interests	9,2%	12,3%	7,5%

#### **Item 4**

The situation deals with reports in Russian media claiming that former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg faces a lawsuit and possible life imprisonment for allegedly provoking the war in Ukraine. This narrative, spread by media outlets like Sputnik and TASS and detailed on a Russian website, is based on a complaint filed by Patrick Pasin, a French researcher and publicist, with the Belgian prosecutor's office. According to Belgian procedure, such a complaint is not the same as a lawsuit and does not automatically initiate legal proceedings; it constitutes a request to investigate whether a crime may have been committed, and the prosecutor can decide whether to open an investigation or close the case without further action. The situation has become part of a broader discussion on NATO's role in the Ukrainian conflict and how various actors present responsibility for the war.

Item 4 was rated as false in all three countries. It scores high with regard to perceived manipulation. This perception is especially strong in Poland. The item has a score above 5 (the middle point) with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group. Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored low. It scores above 5 on its possibility to change others' attitudes and actions.

**Table 13. Evaluation. Item 4**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	2,97	2,94	3,08
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,30	7,05	6,92
c. Emotional effect	4,07	3,55	2,77
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	2,98	3,31	2,54
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,46	2,80	2,48
f. Change attitudes (others)	5,38	5,62	5,55
g. Encouragement to act (others)	5,15	5,57	5,28
h. Reliability	3,18	3,43	3,15
i. Good faith	2,51	3,03	2,82
j. Expression of group interests	6,72	6,40	6,46
k. Based on facts	2,99	3,11	3,11
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	5,74	6,17	6,31
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,71	3,98	3,76
N=	770	778	767

Russia is seen as the likely source of the material. Secondly, online trolls were indicated: in Poland more commonly than in Lithuania or Sweden.

**Table 14. Attribution. Item 4**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	1,2%	6,4%	4,4%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	2,9%	4,4%	6,0%
Alternative media / niche portals	9,1%	9,8%	7,5%
Social media users	14,1%	9,8%	8,9%
Internet trolls / bots	38,6%	18,2%	26,9%
Interest groups / lobbyists	9,5%	17,6%	8,2%
Scientists / experts	0,4%	2,0%	2,2%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	1,2%	3,4%	1,5%
Special services	7,9%	6,4%	11,9%
Owners of social media platforms	3,3%	7,8%	5,2%
Russia	49,8%	47,8%	51,5%
Ukraine	7,5%	4,4%	1,5%
USA	2,1%	13,2%	3,0%
European Union	0,8%	3,4%	5,2%
Israel	2,1%	3,9%	3,7%
Other country	0,8%	0,5%	1,5%

The vast majority of Poles believe that this item is an attempt to manipulate public opinion. In Sweden and Lithuania pluralities believe so.

**Table 15. Goals of FIMI. Item 4**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	2,9%	8,8%	11,9%
To manipulate public opinion	60,9%	42,6%	34,8%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	15,2%	20,1%	14,1%
Satire or joke	1,4%	2,0%	0,7%
To express a personal opinion	2,9%	5,9%	14,8%
To serve political interests	16,7%	20,6%	23,7%

## Item 5

The situation concerns a coordinated online influence campaign allegedly linked to the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, which reportedly allocated around \$2 million to political marketing firm STOIC. The declared goal of the campaign was to strengthen pro-Israeli messaging and intervene in debates conducted in North American groups concerning the Palestinian issue. It focused on audiences in the United States and Canada, relying on a network of over 160 accounts on platforms such as Facebook, X, and Instagram. These accounts, some of which used AI-generated content, shared posts critical of Muslims and sought to link American civil rights movements with support for Israel.

As with previous items, material 5 was rated as false in all three countries. It scores high with regard to perceived manipulation. The item has a score above 6 with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group. Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored low. It scores high on its possibility to change others' attitudes and actions.

**Table 16. Evaluation. Item 5**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	2,99	3,40	3,80
b. Attempt at manipulation	6,95	6,75	6,52
c. Emotional effect	3,84	3,88	2,58
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	3,07	3,60	2,92
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,50	3,20	2,62
f. Change attitudes (others)	5,37	6,00	5,66
g. Encouragement to act (others)	5,37	6,06	5,83
h. Reliability	3,04	3,49	3,60
i. Good faith	2,48	3,10	3,19
j. Expression of group interests	6,51	6,45	6,42
k. Based on facts	2,94	3,36	3,62
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	5,57	5,99	6,01
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,49	3,90	3,74
N=	774	778	767

Unlike items 1 to 4, material 5 is not related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict but to the Middle East. Its attribution differs across countries. In Poland it is most commonly perceived as a creation of internet trolls or (correctly) of Israel. Swedish public opinion is divided in this regard, with the plurality choosing the response internet trolls/bots. Lithuanians are also divided in their opinions.

**Table 17. Attribution. Item 5**

	PL	SE	LT

Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	0,9%	4,5%	1,7%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	3,7%	1,8%	2,9%
Alternative media / niche portals	5,5%	13,5%	16,8%
Social media users	18,3%	20,0%	11,3%
Internet trolls / bots	35,8%	31,8%	22,3%
Interest groups / lobbyists	19,3%	20,0%	25,6%
Scientists / experts	0%	0%	0,8%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	12,8%	16,2%	21,4%
Special services	3,7%	3,6%	5,9%
Owners of social media platforms	6,4%	4,5%	5,5%
Russia	8,3%	10,0%	8,8%
Ukraine	2,8%	1,8%	3,8%
USA	4,6%	7,3%	6,7%
European Union	1,8%	0,9%	3,4%
Israel	26,6%	5,5%	13,9%
Other country	1,8%	3,6%	0,8%

The most commonly seen goal of this item is manipulation of public opinion or, secondly, serving political interests.

**Table 18. Goals of FIMI. Item 5**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	1,8%	10,8%	12,2%
To manipulate public opinion	53,2%	44,1%	47,3%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	11,9%	9,9%	11,0%
Satire or joke	0,9%	3,6%	0,8%
To express a personal opinion	6,4%	5,4%	12,7%
To serve political interests	25,7%	26,1%	16,0%

## Item 6

The situation involves online posts about an alleged new burial method in Europe, described as filling human bodies with resin so that they could be used as coffee tables. This claim was shared by a Georgian-speaking Facebook user and a Russian-speaking Facebook user, both of whom posted an image created with artificial intelligence (AI). This image was based on a photo originally posted by a user on X (formerly Twitter) on June 19, 2023, which in turn was modified from an earlier version shared on June 18, 2023, by user Kelly Port.

Item 6 was seen as an obvious fake. It scores lowest of all in terms of truth. The item has a relatively low score with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group. Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored very low. It scores below 5 on its possibility to change others' attitudes and actions.

**Table 19. Evaluation. Item 6**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	0,93	1,31	1,57
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,41	6,44	6,00

c. Emotional effect	4,66	2,79	1,74
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	2,57	2,40	1,75
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,11	2,39	1,72
f. Change attitudes (others)	4,42	4,30	4,09
g. Encouragement to act (others)	4,41	4,22	4,01
h. Reliability	1,76	2,31	1,73
i. Good faith	1,45	2,08	2,07
j. Expression of group interests	4,47	3,89	4,16
k. Based on facts	1,26	1,69	1,72
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	5,06	5,76	6,00
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	2,59	2,60	2,64
N=	766	775	767

Item 6 was seen as a creation of users: internet trolls or social media.

**Table 20. Attribution. Item 6**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	0%	3,3%	2,1%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	2,2%	2,9%	5,3%
Alternative media / niche portals	8,9%	9,8%	5,8%
Social media users	32,2%	37,7%	25,0%
Internet trolls / bots	55,0%	42,6%	42,9%
Interest groups / lobbyists	12,8%	7,0%	9,0%
Scientists / experts	1,1%	3,3%	4,2%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	2,2%	4,5%	1,6%
Special services	2,2%	2,0%	0,5%
Owners of social media platforms	7,2%	6,6%	12,2%
Russia	15,6%	11,5%	9,5%
Ukraine	2,8%	2,9%	0,5%
USA	1,1%	7,0%	4,2%
European Union	1,1%	1,2%	1,1%
Israel	2,2%	2,9%	0%
Other country	1,1%	0,4%	3,2%

The most common perceived motive was profit, manipulation of public opinion or a joke.

**Table 21. Goals of FIMI. Item 6**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	0,6%	2,9%	3,7%
To manipulate public opinion	27,8%	16,8%	30,2%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	49,4%	39,8%	37,0%
Satire or joke	19,4%	33,6%	21,7%
To express a personal opinion	1,1%	4,1%	6,3%
To serve political interests	1,7%	2,9%	1,1%

## Item 7

The situation concerns events from October 7, where investigators face significant challenges in finding specific forensic evidence regarding sexual assaults committed by terrorists. Despite these difficulties, numerous testimonies and witness accounts describe such crimes. Former hostage Chen Goldstein-Almog and other captives reported being victims of rape, and many

bodies showed signs consistent with sexual abuse and mutilation. The investigation has been hampered by delays in retrieving and examining bodies due to prolonged fighting, complicating efforts to identify perpetrators and gather detailed information. An article in Haaretz discusses these sexual crimes and notes that law enforcement officials and ZAKA members documented the atrocities. However, it does not specifically focus on cases involving children. Contrary to interpretations spread by the "Information Analytical Union" on Facebook, the article does not state that there is no evidence of Hamas's crimes, nor does it deny the killing of children.

This is the second of two items related to the situation in the Middle East. It was seen as relatively reliable: although it scored slightly below 5 in terms of truth, the score was highest of all items. It also had relatively low scores as regards perceived manipulation. Its factuality is evaluated highest of all items. It also scores relatively high with regard to accountability.

**Table 22. Evaluation. Item 7**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	4,51	4,40	4,51
b. Attempt at manipulation	5,82	5,82	5,83
c. Emotional effect	5,12	4,81	2,85
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	4,35	4,39	3,54
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	3,17	3,59	2,81
f. Change attitudes (others)	5,73	6,22	5,99
g. Encouragement to act (others)	5,57	6,03	5,80
h. Reliability	4,42	4,46	4,12
i. Good faith	4,23	4,10	3,95
j. Expression of group interests	6,17	6,24	6,36
k. Based on facts	4,54	4,34	4,41
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	4,99	5,46	5,53
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	4,80	4,71	4,44
N=	756	775	767

The public opinion was divided in the attribution. The (correct) attribution to anti-Israeli groups was shared by a group ranging from one-fifth to a quarter. A common attribution was to Israel, due to the fact that the material referenced Israeli media.

**Table 23. Attribution. Item 7**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	2,2%	2,5%	2,7%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	9,2%	7,6%	8,2%
Alternative media / niche portals	14,0%	16,8%	21,1%
Social media users	12,7%	16,0%	8,9%
Internet trolls / bots	12,7%	11,8%	14,4%
Interest groups / lobbyists	15,3%	14,3%	16,3%
Scientists / experts	3,9%	8,4%	0,7%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	20,1%	24,4%	23,8%
Special services	13,5%	1,7%	4,8%
Owners of social media platforms	8,7%	3,4%	12,3%
Russia	5,2%	8,3%	11,0%

Ukraine	0,4%	0%	0,7%
USA	3,9%	7,6%	2,1%
European Union	1,7%	2,5%	1,4%
Israel	26,2%	18,5%	16,4%
Other country	1,7%	1,7%	2,0%

Public opinion in all three countries was divided in the perception of goals. A relatively common response was that the goal was to reliably inform the public.

**Table 24. Goals of FIMI. Item 7**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	21,4%	31,1%	19,7%
To manipulate public opinion	27,1%	28,6%	32,0%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	14,4%	16,0%	10,2%
Satire or joke	0,9%	0,8%	2,7%
To express a personal opinion	12,7%	8,4%	12,2%
To serve political interests	23,6%	15,1%	23,1%

## Item 8

The situation concerns a series of cross-border accusations regarding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his wife, Olena Zelenska, suggesting that funds provided by Western partners for Ukraine's defence were used to finance luxury goods such as residences, casinos, and yachts. These narratives circulate in various regions, from Eastern Europe to Latin America, and appear in different languages and formats. One of the most notable examples is a video claiming that Olena Zelenska spent a million dollars on jewellery in New York in September 2023, including an alleged receipt. This recording first appeared on African websites and was subsequently picked up by other media. Another story claimed that President Zelensky purchased a hotel-casino in Cyprus.

As with other items related to Russia-Ukraine conflict, material 8 was rated as false in all three countries. It scores high with regard to perceived manipulation. The item has a score above 6 with regard to perceived benefit it is expected to bring to some interest group. Its factuality, reliability and the good faith of the producers are scored low.

**Table 25. Evaluation. Item 8**

Means	PL	SE	LT
a. Truth	2,84	3,22	3,15
b. Attempt at manipulation	7,32	6,70	7,04
c. Emotional effect	4,34	3,60	2,75
d. Change attitudes (respondent)	3,46	3,52	2,88
e. Encouragement to act (respondent)	2,37	2,90	2,54
f. Change attitudes (others)	6,04	5,70	5,99
g. Encouragement to act (others)	5,69	5,52	5,53

h. Reliability	3,11	3,55	3,17
i. Good faith	2,25	3,20	2,81
j. Expression of group interests	6,80	6,42	6,57
k. Based on facts	2,82	3,22	3,18
l. Based on hearsay, beliefs or myths	5,99	6,15	6,55
m. Accountability (possibility of verification/explanation)	3,27	3,52	3,43
N=	765	775	766

Russia is seen as the likely source of the material. Secondly, online trolls were indicated: in Poland more commonly than in Lithuania or Sweden. The perceived goal of this material is the manipulation of the public or serving a political interest.

**Table 26. Attribution. Item 8**

	PL	SE	LT
Polish / Swedish / Lithuanian politicians / political party from PL/SE/LT / other entities from PL/SE/LT	2,9%	1,8%	3,8%
Traditional media (television, news portals)	6,6%	8,6%	8,8%
Alternative media / niche portals	5,8%	6,8%	10,7%
Social media users	13,1%	10,1%	9,5%
Internet trolls / bots	32,8%	23,4%	26,6%
Interest groups / lobbyists	16,1%	13,7%	13,3%
Scientists / experts	0,7%	2,9%	1,3%
Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)	4,4%	1,8%	2,5%
Special services	9,5%	5,0%	8,2%
Owners of social media platforms	5,1%	5,4%	5,0%
Russia	62,8%	57,6%	48,7%
Ukraine	2,9%	6,1%	9,4%
USA	0%	9,4%	3,8%
European Union	1,5%	3,6%	3,2%
Israel	0,7%	2,2%	2,5%
Other country	2,2%	1,4%	0,6%

**Table 27. Goals of FIMI. Item 8**

	PL	SE	LT
To reliably inform the public	7,3%	11,6%	7,0%
To manipulate public opinion	51,8%	45,1%	46,8%
To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)	10,2%	15,5%	13,9%
Satire or joke	2,2%	2,2%	3,8%
To express a personal opinion	2,9%	7,2%	8,9%
To serve political interests	25,5%	18,4%	19,6%

## Application of the DISARM Red framework

The items tested in the research were tagged according to the DISARM Red framework. Correspondingly, the survey included the tags used in the framework to establish the degree to which they are present in the subjective perspectives of populations in Poland, Sweden and Lithuania.

In Poland, Sweden and Lithuania the most common perceived tactics and goals of the content creators were: developing inauthentic news, dismaying the public, sowing divisions in society,

distorting reality, reframing content, smearing and polarising. In Sweden, more often than in Poland and Lithuania, the role of social media in spreading FIMI is noted.

The responses regarding item 6 correctly noted the use of AI-generated images in creating the material. In all three countries, it was the most common response related to item 6. On the other hand, compared to other items, it was seen as less likely to smear opponents or polarize society.

**Table 28. DISARM red categories: Poland**

PL	data in %	Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
T0002:	Facilitate State Propaganda		10,0	7,2	12,8	12,0	10,1	2,8	10,9	10,9
T0003:	Leverage Existing Narratives		2,9	3,0	3,6	2,9	7,3	1,7	5,2	5,8
T0007:	Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups		8,3	4,8	4,1	5,8	7,3	4,4	4,4	10,2
T0010:	Cultivate Ignorant Agents		2,9	3,0	4,1	2,5	4,6	2,2	0,4	2,9
T0022.001:	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives		8,3	8,4	8,7	9,1	11,9	5,6	5,7	12,4
T0022.002:	Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives		6,6	4,8	2,6	3,3	6,4	3,3	3,1	5,1
T0022:	Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives		10,8	15,6	14,9	11,2	17,4	7,2	7,4	12,4
T0023.001:	Reframe Context		24,9	15,6	22,1	19,2	17,4	17,2	11,4	17,5
T0023.002:	Edit Open-Source Content		12,0	5,4	11,8	11,2	7,3	6,1	7,4	9,5
T0023:	Distort Facts		26,6	13,2	24,6	24,3	26,6	16,7	21,4	19,7
T0042:	Seed Kernel of Truth		7,5	4,2	3,6	6,9	5,5	3,3	14,0	7,3
T0044:	Seed Distortions		23,7	17,4	32,3	23,2	29,4	15,6	21,8	23,4
T0045:	Use Fake Experts		4,6	7,8	2,1	8,3	9,2	8,9	7,0	8,8
T0066:	Degrade Adversary		20,7	18,0	13,3	26,1	5,5	1,1	14,4	23,4
T0072:	Segment Audiences		7,1	9,0	6,7	8,7	16,5	3,9	7,9	10,2
T0073:	Determine Target Audiences		4,6	3,0	4,6	4,0	6,4	4,4	6,6	5,8
T0074.001:	Geopolitical Advantage		4,1	6,0	2,1	6,9	5,5	0,6	4,4	5,8
T0075.001:	Discredit Credible Sources		6,6	6,0	4,1	9,4	5,5	4,4	9,2	5,1
T0076:	Distort		20,3	19,8	25,1	24,6	20,2	20,0	17,5	16,8
T0078:	Dismay		22,8	18,6	27,7	25,0	33,9	27,8	20,1	21,9
T0079:	Divide		16,6	20,4	14,4	18,1	30,3	7,2	13,5	24,1
T0080.001:	Monitor Social Media Analytics		2,9	1,8	1,5	0,7		2,2	1,7	1,5
T0080:	Map Target Audience Information Env.		3,3	4,2	5,6	2,2	5,5	1,1	2,2	5,1
T0081.005:	Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives		5,8	4,8	5,6	4,7	10,1	1,7	3,9	6,6
T0083:	Integrate Target Audience Vuln. into Narrative		3,7	6,6	3,6	3,6	3,7	5,6	5,7	3,6
T0084.004:	Appropriate Content		1,2	1,2	3,6	1,4	1,8	2,2	0,9	
T0084:	Reuse Existing Content		4,1	1,8	7,7	3,6	3,7	8,3	3,5	2,2
T0085.001:	Develop AI-Generated Text		6,2	9,6	7,7	9,8	21,1	23,3	2,6	10,9
T0085.003:	Develop Inauthentic News Articles		37,3	22,2	26,2	28,6	24,8	32,8	16,6	33,6
T0085.004:	Develop Document		2,5	2,4	1,0	0,4	0,9	0,6	6,1	
T0085:	Develop Text-Based Content		4,6	3,0	0,5	3,6	1,8	1,7	5,2	3,6
T0086.002:	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)		7,1	7,2	19,5	5,8	17,4	37,8	4,4	7,3
T0086.003:	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)		8,7	6,6	21,0	2,9	18,3	31,7	2,2	10,2
T0086:	Develop Image-Based Content		5,8	7,2	17,9	3,6	11,0	13,9	3,9	5,1
T0087:	Develop Video-Based Content		2,1	1,2		1,1	0,9	1,7	1,7	
T0090.001:	Create Anonymous Accounts		4,6	5,4	4,6	3,6	9,2	3,9	1,3	3,6
T0090.003:	Create Bot Accounts		2,9	4,2	7,7	5,8	10,1	10,0	1,7	6,6
T0090.004:	Create Sockpuppet Accounts		3,3	2,4	2,6	2,9	4,6	2,8	1,3	2,9
T0090:	Create Inauthentic Accounts		4,1	4,8	5,6	4,7	9,2	8,9	2,2	7,3
T0097.102:	Journalist Persona		18,7	13,8	5,1	13,8	16,5	12,2	13,5	16,1
T0097.111:	Government Official Persona		6,6	9,6	1,5	5,8	2,8		4,4	2,2
T0101:	Create Localised Content		1,7	2,4	1,0	1,1	1,8	1,1	0,9	2,2
T0102.001:	Use Existing Echo Chambers		6,6	4,8	5,1	6,5	5,5	3,3	4,8	4,4
T0104:	Social Networks		8,3	5,4	8,2	6,5	10,1	8,9	3,5	8,0
T0105.002:	Video Sharing		1,7	1,8	0,5			2,2	0,9	0,7
T0111:	Traditional Media		4,1	1,2	2,1	2,2	0,9	0,6	1,7	0,7
T0113:	Employ Commercial Analytic Firm		0,8	1,2	0,5	0,7		0,6	1,3	
T0114.001:	Social Media		6,2	6,0	6,7	4,3	8,3	7,2	5,7	7,3
T0115:	Post Content		3,7	7,2	4,6	4,7	3,7	8,3	1,7	8,0
T0118:	Amplify Existing Narrative		3,7	3,6	5,6	2,9	5,5	1,1	7,9	5,1
T0119:	Cross-Posting		6,2	8,4	5,1	5,4	7,3	4,4	5,2	7,3
T0120.001:	Use Affiliate Marketing Programmes		2,1	2,4	2,1	2,9	1,8	5,6	2,6	5,1
T0128.001:	Use Pseudonyms		1,7	1,2	1,0	1,1		3,3	0,9	
T0128.002:	Conceal Network Identity		2,1	2,4	2,6	1,1		2,2	1,3	3,6
T0128:	Conceal Information Assets		2,9	3,0	0,5	1,4	1,8	0,6	1,7	3,6
T0132.002:	Content Focused		1,2	2,4	2,1	2,5	1,8	2,8	4,8	2,2
T0135.001:	Smear		13,7	18,6	8,7	22,8	11,9	1,1	15,7	29,9
T0135.003:	Subvert		12,9	12,6	12,8	23,9	4,6	2,2	5,2	19,7
T0135.004:	Polarise		14,1	12,6	12,8	13,4	20,2	6,7	13,1	18,2
T0135:	Undermine		8,7	7,8	8,7	13,4	14,7	7,2	5,7	14,6
T0136.002:	Justify Action		2,9	0,6	4,1	2,5	3,7	1,1	8,7	2,2
T0136.003:	Energise Supporters		5,0	6,0	5,6	8,7	10,1	1,1	7,0	5,1
T0136.004:	Boost Reputation		3,7	1,8	0,5	0,7	0,9	0,6	4,8	1,5
T0136:	Cultivate Support		1,2	0,6	0,5	1,1	1,8	0,6	2,6	
T0141.001:	Acquire Compromised Account		2,1	1,8	1,5	0,7	2,8	0,6	0,9	0,7

**Table 29. DISARM red categories: Sweden**

SE	data in %	Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
T0002:	Facilitate State Propaganda		1,0	9,0	5,9	6,9	4,5	1,2	5,9	7,2
T0003:	Leverage Existing Narratives		6,3		5,5	5,9	7,2	4,5	10,1	5,8
T0007:	Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups		16,3	15,5	10,3	10,8	15,3	10,2	11,8	14,7
T0010:	Cultivate Ignorant Agents		2,6	2,6	1,6	1,0	4,5	0,8	1,7	2,2
T0022.001:	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives		8,4	13,5	8,7	13,2	13,5	2,9	10,1	12,6
T0022.002:	Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives		14,2	14,8	9,9	17,2	12,7	10,2	10,1	20,5
T0022:	Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives		15,3	14,7	13,5	16,2	24,5	6,1	10,9	16,9
T0023.001:	Reframe Context		6,3	6,4	5,1	5,9	8,1	1,6	7,6	5,4
T0023.002:	Edit Open-Source Content		4,2	3,9	2,4	1,0		3,7	4,2	1,8
T0023:	Distort Facts		23,2	19,4	24,1	28,6	25,5	19,7	24,4	24,8
T0042:	Seed Kernel of Truth		3,7	4,5	4,0	6,4	3,6	1,2	4,2	5,4
T0044:	Seed Distortions		15,8	17,3	8,3	13,8	20,9	10,7	7,6	12,9
T0045:	Use Fake Experts		13,2	9,0	5,6	12,3	7,2	6,6	12,6	10,1
T0066:	Degrade Adversary		7,4	6,5	3,6	7,4	8,2	1,2	6,7	9,4
T0072:	Segment Audiences		2,1	4,5	4,7	3,4	3,6	1,6	3,4	3,6
T0073:	Determine Target Audiences		2,1	0,6	2,0	3,9	6,4	2,5	4,2	4,7
T0074.001:	Geopolitical Advantage		6,3	7,1	2,0	2,5	3,6	1,2	5,0	4,3
T0075.001:	Discredit Credible Sources		5,8	3,8	6,7	9,8	2,7	3,3	9,2	5,0
T0076:	Distort		26,3	21,9	18,6	27,0	24,5	16,8	17,6	21,9
T0078:	Dismay		8,9	10,3	7,9	10,3	26,4	20,9	8,4	10,4
T0079:	Divide		23,0	20,0	16,6	22,7	23,6	4,5	16,8	25,9
T0080.001:	Monitor Social Media Analytics		2,1	3,2	2,8	2,0	0,9	2,5		3,6
T0080:	Map Target Audience Information Env.		1,1	1,9	2,0	0,5	2,7		1,7	3,6
T0081.005:	Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives		4,2	6,5	4,7	4,4	5,5	5,3	5,0	5,4
T0083:	Integrate Target Audience Vuln. into Narrative		4,7	0,6	1,6	2,0	4,5	2,5	8,4	4,7
T0084.004:	Appropriate Content		4,2	3,2		2,0	1,8	1,6	5,0	2,5
T0084:	Reuse Existing Content		2,1	3,2	2,0	2,0	2,7	3,3	3,4	2,5
T0085.001:	Develop AI-Generated Text		10,5	8,4	3,6	10,8	6,4	17,2	7,6	7,9
T0085.003:	Develop Inauthentic News Articles		9,5	15,5	9,9	12,3	11,8	14,4	8,4	15,1
T0085.004:	Develop Document		3,2	2,6	1,6	1,0	0,9	0,4	2,5	4,0
T0085:	Develop Text-Based Content		1,1	1,9	2,0	1,5	2,7	1,2	2,5	3,6
T0086.002:	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)		11,1	9,7	12,7	7,4	9,0	38,7	1,7	8,3
T0086.003:	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)		5,8	5,8	9,5	8,4	9,0	16,8	0,8	6,5
T0086:	Develop Image-Based Content		1,1	1,9	4,3	4,4	2,7	4,9	0,8	1,8
T0087:	Develop Video-Based Content		0,5	3,2	2,0	1,5	1,8	0,4	1,7	2,5
T0090.001:	Create Anonymous Accounts		2,6	4,5	3,2	3,9	2,7	5,3	1,7	4,3
T0090.003:	Create Bot Accounts		3,7	2,6	2,4	6,4	2,7	4,5	4,2	4,3
T0090.004:	Create Sockpuppet Accounts		1,6	1,9	1,6	2,9		2,5		3,6
T0090:	Create Inauthentic Accounts		9,5	9,7	4,3	6,9	12,7	6,6	4,2	7,9
T0097.102:	Journalist Persona		4,7	4,5	1,6	1,5		0,4	5,0	4,7
T0097.111:	Government Official Persona		4,2	4,5	1,2	3,0		0,4	1,7	2,5
T0101:	Create Localised Content		1,1	1,3	1,6	1,0	2,7	0,8	2,5	1,8
T0102.001:	Use Existing Echo Chambers		1,6	1,3	0,8	0,5	1,8	1,2	0,8	1,8
T0104:	Social Networks		7,9	7,7	12,3	9,3	8,1	5,7	5,0	7,9
T0105.002:	Video Sharing		3,7	3,9	2,0	3,0	4,5	2,5	0,8	2,2
T0111:	Traditional Media		2,6	0,6	3,2	2,5	0,9	1,2	3,4	1,1
T0113:	Employ Commercial Analytic Firm		2,1	0,6	0,4	1,0	0,9	0,4	1,7	1,4
T0114.001:	Social Media		11,6	14,2	16,6	12,3	20,0	18,4	10,1	12,6
T0115:	Post Content		3,7	5,1	6,3	7,8	8,2	6,1	13,4	6,8
T0118:	Amplify Existing Narrative		3,7	2,6	4,3	4,4	4,5	3,3	5,0	6,8
T0119:	Cross-Posting		5,8	5,8	4,0	4,9	4,5	4,5	5,0	4,0
T0120.001:	Use Affiliate Marketing Programmes		0,5	0,6	2,4	1,0	1,8	1,2	2,5	0,7
T0128.001:	Use Pseudonyms		3,2	2,6	3,2	1,5	1,8	0,4	2,5	1,1
T0128.002:	Conceal Network Identity		2,1	3,2	1,2	3,9	0,9	2,0	2,5	3,6
T0128:	Conceal Information Assets		3,2		2,0	2,0	2,7	1,6	2,5	3,2
T0132.002:	Content Focused		2,1	2,6	1,2	1,0	0,9	0,8	0,8	1,4
T0135.001:	Smear		27,4	32,9	13,0	37,7	28,8	7,8	14,3	34,9
T0135.003:	Subvert		13,2	11,5	10,3	16,7	10,0	2,9	13,4	15,8
T0135.004:	Polarise		12,6	8,4	7,5	15,8	20,9	3,7	14,3	13,3
T0135:	Undermine		14,2	13,5	10,3	16,2	11,8	2,9	10,9	16,9
T0136.002:	Justify Action		3,1	2,6	3,6	3,9	1,8	0,8	5,0	6,5
T0136.003:	Energise Supporters		4,7	4,5	3,6	4,9	9,1	2,9	8,4	5,0
T0136.004:	Boost Reputation		6,8	6,5	11,1	11,3	10,9	5,3	13,4	10,4
T0136:	Cultivate Support		1,6	2,6	4,3		6,3	0,4	5,9	4,3
T0141.001:	Acquire Compromised Account		2,6	1,3		1,5		0,8	0,8	1,1

**Table 30. DISARM red categories: Lithuania**

LT	data in %	Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
T0002:	Facilitate State Propaganda		3,0	6,4	6,8	5,9	2,5	4,8	2,7	2,5
T0003:	Leverage Existing Narratives		1,0	3,4	1,8	4,4	4,2	0,5	4,1	3,8
T0007:	Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups		6,9	6,4	1,1	5,9	2,1	3,2	2,7	5,7
T0010:	Cultivate Ignorant Agents		9,9	9,4	9,0	4,5	7,1	10,1	4,8	10,8
T0022.001:	Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives		10,4	15,8	5,0	7,5	14,3	8,5	5,4	14,6
T0022.002:	Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives		9,0	12,8	7,5	9,0	7,6	6,9	6,8	8,2
T0022:	Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives		17,8	14,9	12,9	13,3	15,5	9,5	13,7	14,6
T0023.001:	Reframe Context		4,5	4,5	4,7	6,0	2,9	0,5	2,7	1,3
T0023.002:	Edit Open-Source Content		1,0	3,0	2,2	2,2	2,1	2,6	4,8	3,2
T0023:	Distort Facts		28,2	32,7	22,9	19,4	21,4	19,1	31,5	36,5
T0042:	Seed Kernel of Truth		5,0	4,5	1,8	4,5	5,0	0,5	4,1	3,8
T0044:	Seed Distortions		16,4	15,3	10,4	8,2	7,6	8,5	11,6	12,0
T0045:	Use Fake Experts		14,4	13,3	4,6	7,5	9,7	6,9	12,3	12,7
T0066:	Degrade Adversary		10,9	5,4	7,2	11,9	6,3	2,1	4,1	6,9
T0072:	Segment Audiences		4,0	3,9	0,4	3,7	3,8	1,6	1,4	3,8
T0073:	Determine Target Audiences		1,5	6,9	3,9	3,7	4,6	3,7	4,1	3,8
T0074.001:	Geopolitical Advantage		2,5	1,0	4,7	2,2	2,1	0,5	0,7	1,9
T0075.001:	Discredit Credible Sources		7,9	11,3	4,3	11,2	4,2	3,7	13,6	7,6
T0076:	Distort		24,9	22,3	22,9	19,3	18,9	19,0	21,2	26,4
T0078:	Dismay		4,0	4,4	9,0	5,2	4,6	9,5	4,8	4,4
T0079:	Divide		2,0	1,5	2,5	2,2	2,9		1,4	2,5
T0080.001:	Monitor Social Media Analytics		2,0	3,0	2,5	2,2	3,4	3,7	2,7	1,9
T0080:	Map Target Audience Information Env.		2,0	2,5	2,2	1,5	2,5	1,6	3,4	0,6
T0081.005:	Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives		1,5	2,5	2,9	0,7	2,1	1,6	2,1	2,5
T0083:	Integrate Target Audience Vuln. into Narrative		5,9	5,4	2,5	7,5	7,6	6,9	8,9	9,5
T0084.004:	Appropriate Content		0,5	2,5	1,4	1,5	1,3	1,1		0,6
T0084:	Reuse Existing Content		3,0	2,5	1,8	5,2	1,3	4,8	4,1	3,1
T0085.001:	Develop AI-Generated Text		12,4	11,9	7,2	12,6	13,4	21,2	7,5	13,9
T0085.003:	Develop Inauthentic News Articles		16,8	12,4	7,2	10,4	6,3	6,9	13,7	13,3
T0085.004:	Develop Document		2,0	10,9	1,8	2,2	2,1	2,1	3,4	7,6
T0085:	Develop Text-Based Content		6,9	8,4	2,9	5,2	5,5	1,6	6,2	3,8
T0086.002:	Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)		10,4	8,9	10,4	7,5	14,3	28,6	2,7	7,0
T0086.003:	Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)		11,4	11,4	16,4	4,5	10,9	19,6	3,4	8,2
T0086:	Develop Image-Based Content		6,0	4,0	11,8	1,5	8,4	8,5	2,7	3,8
T0087:	Develop Video-Based Content		6,9	2,5	8,6	3,7	8,0	10,1	1,4	3,8
T0090.001:	Create Anonymous Accounts		4,5	3,0	2,9	2,2	5,9	4,8	3,4	3,8
T0090.003:	Create Bot Accounts		5,9	4,0	4,3	8,2	6,3	9,5	1,4	8,2
T0090.004:	Create Sockpuppet Accounts		1,5	0,5	1,1	0,7	1,3	1,6	0,7	1,3
T0090:	Create Inauthentic Accounts		7,4	3,9	2,1	6,0	7,6	6,9	2,7	4,4
T0097.102:	Journalist Persona		5,4	5,0	2,5	3,7	3,4	2,7	8,9	5,7
T0097.111:	Government Official Persona		3,5	3,0	3,9	3,0	0,4		1,4	0,6
T0101:	Create Localised Content		2,5	1,0	0,7	3,0	3,4	2,6	1,4	1,3
T0102.001:	Use Existing Echo Chambers		5,0	8,9	3,2	5,2	6,3	6,9	4,8	6,3
T0104:	Social Networks		11,9	12,9	9,0	11,2	15,9	9,0	8,2	14,6
T0105.002:	Video Sharing		5,0	2,0	6,8	3,0	6,7	9,0	2,1	3,8
T0111:	Traditional Media		1,5	1,5	2,9	4,5	2,1	0,5	4,8	3,2
T0113:	Employ Commercial Analytic Firm		0,5	1,0	1,4	1,5	1,3	2,6		1,3
T0114.001:	Social Media		5,5	9,4	4,7	8,1	7,6	5,3	6,8	6,9
T0115:	Post Content		4,0	7,4	3,9	11,9	6,7	4,8	4,1	3,8
T0118:	Amplify Existing Narrative		3,0	2,0	3,2	5,2	4,6	1,1	4,8	3,2
T0119:	Cross-Posting		3,0	6,4	2,5	4,5	4,2	8,5	5,4	9,4
T0120.001:	Use Affiliate Marketing Programmes		0,5	2,0	1,4	0,7	0,8		0,7	1,3
T0128.001:	Use Pseudonyms		1,0	1,0	1,8	2,2	1,7	1,1	1,4	1,9
T0128.002:	Conceal Network Identity		4,5	2,5	1,8	0,7	1,3	1,6	2,7	3,1
T0128:	Conceal Information Assets		1,0	2,0	0,7	3,0	1,7	1,6	0,7	2,5
T0132.002:	Content Focused		1,0	1,5	1,4	2,2	1,7	1,1	0,7	0,6
T0135.001:	Smear		27,7	33,2	14,3	28,4	13,9	9,5	15,8	37,7
T0135.003:	Subvert		2,5	5,9	3,9	6,7	7,6	2,1	0,7	4,4
T0135.004:	Polarise		4,5	5,0	6,1	5,2	7,1	1,1	2,7	4,4
T0135:	Undermine		22,3	20,7	13,3	12,7	14,3	8,5	18,4	29,1
T0136.002:	Justify Action		0,5	1,5	1,8	3,7	4,6	0,5	6,8	2,5
T0136.003:	Energise Supporters		2,5	5,4	3,2	3,0	9,7	2,6	6,2	3,8
T0136.004:	Boost Reputation		1,5	1,0	4,7	1,5	2,1	1,1	7,5	0,6
T0136:	Cultivate Support		2,5	2,0	0,7	3,0	2,5	2,1	1,4	3,8
T0141.001:	Acquire Compromised Account		1,5	1,0	1,4	1,5	0,4	2,6	1,4	1,9

## Consequences and counteraction

The main perceived consequences of FIMI are: informational chaos, formation of false beliefs and misleading the public with regard to specific facts. Polarization of society was mentioned in Poland and Lithuania more often than in Sweden. In all three countries, relatively large groups of respondents indicated consequences such as the emergence of fear and uncertainty and loss of trust in institutions.

**Table 31. Consequences of FIMI**

What do you think is the main consequence (social impact) of disseminating the message? In %	PL	SE	LT
Generating / fuelling conflict (polarization)	29,1	18,2	24,6
Misleading the recipient regarding specific facts	28,3	23,1	22,6
Creating chaos / informational noise	37,9	27,0	30,9
Presenting alternative viewpoints	5,3	8,1	7,7
Increasing the audience's knowledge about the world	2,9	4,7	4,9
Loss of trust in institutions	12,6	8,6	9,2
Changing voters' political preferences	8,1	12,1	6,8
Disrupting public discourse	11,5	13,5	6,6
Creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty	20,1	14,7	17,2
Formation of false beliefs	34,0	34,8	32,4
Expanding the sphere of communication freedom	2,9	3,2	4,5
Efficient functioning of the democratic system	2,0	3,1	3,6
Raising public interest in a specific issue	12,8	12,3	12,4

Multiple-choice question, maximum 3 answers.

Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian societies differ in opinions on disinformation combat. Swedes attach the greatest importance to general skills: fostering critical attitude towards the media and increasing the general knowledge about the world. Poles, on the other hand, in the first place indicate building specific (fact-checking) skills. In Lithuania the most popular idea is that misleading content should be banned. In spite of these differences, the actions mentioned above are indicated by significant groups of the population in all three countries.

Swedes are much less likely than Poles or Lithuanians to advocate measures to improve traditional media. This finding is related to higher role of social media in spreading misleading narratives in Sweden. Banning content is less often advocated in Sweden than in Poland or Lithuania.

**Table 32. Counteracting**

Which of the following actions do you think is the most important in building society's resilience to disinformation? In %	PL	SE	LT
Banning such messages	34,5	29,5	48,2
Annotating such messages with comments	21,6	13,8	16,9
Building specific skills on the part of recipients (e.g., fact-checking skills)	43,6	35,9	39,3
Increasing overall knowledge about the world	34,2	48,9	27,7
Fostering a critical attitude towards media messages and awareness of media operations	23,7	50,4	21,9
Striving to improve the quality of traditional media	22,2	8,4	21,0
Promoting and supporting the work of fact-checkers (information verification specialists)	22,2	31,3	22,5
No actions should be taken as they bring more harm than good	5,3	4,7	4,4

Multiple-choice question, maximum 3 answers

## Conclusions

Here are some of the main conclusions of the research:

- Overall, the content is correctly recognized as manipulative in all three countries. The average indicates that the prevailing opinion is that items are: an attempt at manipulation, that they are based on hearsay, beliefs or myths. They are not perceived as true, based on facts, verifiable, prepared reliably, or prepared with good intention.
- The items attributed to Russia or its proxies by professionals are also widely recognized as such by society.
- On the other hand, information related to the Middle East can be actually misleading. The highest scores as far as perceived truth is concerned, and the lowest perceived manipulation are associated with Item 7, which is framed in quasi-journalistic style. This result confirms our findings (published elsewhere) that disinformation framed as journalism, neutral and pseudo-factual is an effective tool of disinformation. Such material reinforces existing views and stereotypes.
- Attribution of Items 5 and 7 (i.e. material related the Israel-Palestine conflict) proved to be difficult and produced frequent false outcomes.
- The AI-generated image used in our survey (Item 6) was correctly recognized by respondents. However, the material was seen as clickbait or satire, rather than political manipulation.
- As a final point: The surveys indicate that societies of the three countries in the study are all largely resistant to anti-Ukrainian narratives promoted by Russia and its non-state agents. As a problem for further research, there is a question about the mechanism of this resistance. Are people able to spot misleading narratives? Or are they prone to reject pro-Russian narratives due to their pre-existing beliefs, i.e. as a result of processes such as confirmation bias (rejection of facts inconsistent with existing views)?

# ANNEX

## ADAC Questionnaire

### **Part 1: Introduction and Consent**

A team from SWPS University and the ADAC.io consortium is conducting a study on the perception of medical messages.

Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate without giving any reason. You also have the full right to withdraw from the study at any time during its duration (and within two weeks of completing the questionnaire) without any negative consequences. No justification is required for your decision to withdraw, and if you do so, your data collected to date will not be included in the final analysis.

The following personal data will be collected, used, and stored as part of this study

The following specific and sensitive personal data will be collected, used, and stored as part of the study

All information collected will be analyzed only in aggregate form and presented in a way that prevents any responses from being linked to a specific person. Access to raw, anonymous data will be restricted to those directly involved in conducting this study. This data will be stored in a secure manner and used only for scientific purposes, such as preparing publications, conference presentations, or theses, in accordance with the stated purpose of the study.

Completing the questionnaire will take approximately 30 minutes.

Taking into account the information provided above, I agree to participate in the study:

Yes (continue)

No (end study)

### **Part 2: Material Assessment Block**

**Division into sub-samples. For each respondent, 4 materials will be randomly selected from the 8 used in the study. Each respondent evaluates 4 materials. Each respondent will assess the material twice: in the first round, questions 1-5 will be asked, and in the second round, question 6 will be asked. In both rounds, the same 4 materials will**

**be evaluated.**

**The first material is displayed to the respondent. Ask questions 1-5.**

**[MATERIAL 1] - Ask questions 1-5.**

**[MATERIAL 2] - Ask questions 1-5.**

**[MATERIAL 3] - Ask questions 1-5.**

**[MATERIAL 4] - Ask questions 1-5.**

**1. Now please answer a few questions regarding the content above.**

**Please express your opinion on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you completely disagree with the statement, and 10 means you fully agree with it. Of course, you can also choose points between the extremes of the scale. (Scale 0 to 10, 0 - completely disagree, 10 - fully agree).**

**Do you think this material ...**

- a. conveys true information
- b. attempts manipulation
- c. personally touches you
- d. can change your attitudes and/or opinions
- e. may prompt you to take some action
- f. may change the attitudes and/or opinions of other people
- g. may lead other people to take some action
- h. is prepared reliably
- i. is prepared in good faith
- j. serves the interests of a specific social or professional group
- k. is based on facts
- l. is based on rumors, beliefs, or myths
- m. is prepared by an author or organization that can be contacted for clarification

**2. Would you share this information on your social media?**

- 1. Definitely yes
- 2. Probably yes
- 3. Probably not
- 4. Definitely not

**3. What do you think was the main goal (intention) of the author of this message?  
(single-choice question)**

- 1. To reliably inform the public
- 2. To manipulate public opinion
- 3. To achieve profit (e.g., "clickbait" for ads)
- 4. Satire or joke
- 5. To express a personal opinion
- 6. To serve political interests

**4. Who do you think is most likely behind the dissemination of this message?  
(multiple-choice question, maximum 3 answers)**

1. Polish/Swedish/Lithuanian politicians / political party from Poland/Sweden/Lithuania / other entities from Poland/Sweden/Lithuania
2. Traditional media (television, news portals)
3. Alternative media / niche portals
4. Social media users
5. Internet trolls / bots
6. Interest groups / lobbyists
7. Scientists / experts
8. Terrorist organizations (e.g., Hamas)
9. Special services
10. Owners of social media platforms
11. Russia
12. Ukraine
13. USA
14. European Union
15. Israel
16. Other country (which?)

**5. What do you think is the main consequence (social impact) of disseminating this message? (multiple-choice question, maximum 3 answers)**

1. Generating / fueling conflict (polarization)
2. Misleading the recipient regarding specific facts
3. Creating chaos / informational noise
4. Presenting alternative viewpoints
5. Increasing the audience's knowledge about the world
6. Loss of trust in institutions
7. Changing voters' political preferences
8. Disrupting public discourse
9. Creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty
10. Formation of false beliefs
11. Expanding the sphere of communication freedom
12. Efficient functioning of the democratic system
13. Raising public interest in a specific issue

**Re-display the first material. Ask question 6.**

[MATERIAL 1] - Ask questions 6.

[MATERIAL 2] - Ask questions 6.

[MATERIAL 3] - Ask questions 6.

[MATERIAL 4] - Ask questions 6.

**6. What technical and stylistic means do you think were used in this message? Multiple answers possible.**

T0002: Facilitate State Propaganda
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T0003: Leverage Existing Narratives
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T0007: Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
T0010: Cultivate Ignorant Agents
T0022.001: Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives
T0022.002: Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives
T0022: Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
T0023.001: Reframe Context
T0023.002: Edit Open-Source Content
T0023: Distort Facts
T0042: Seed Kernel of Truth
T0044: Seed Distortions
T0045: Use Fake Experts
T0066: Degrade Adversary
T0072: Segment Audiences
T0073: Determine Target Audiences
T0074.001: Geopolitical Advantage
T0075.001: Discredit Credible Sources
T0076: Distort
T0078: Dismay
T0079: Divide
T0080.001: Monitor Social Media Analytics
T0080: Map Target Audience Information Environment
T0081.005: Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicious
T0083: Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
T0084.004: Appropriate Content
T0084: Reuse Existing Content
T0085.001: Develop AI-Generated Text
T0085.003: Develop Inauthentic News Articles
T0085.004: Develop Document
T0085: Develop Text-Based Content
T0086.002: Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)
T0086.003: Deceptively Edit Images (Cheap Fakes)
T0086: Develop Image-Based Content
T0087.001: Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes)
T0087: Develop Video-Based Content
T0090.001: Create Anonymous Accounts
T0090.003: Create Bot Accounts
T0090.004: Create Sockpuppet Accounts
T0090: Create Inauthentic Accounts
T0097.102: Journalist Persona
T0097.111: Government Official Persona
T0101: Create Localised Content
T0102.001: Use Existing Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
T0104: Social Networks
T0105.002: Video Sharing
T0111: Traditional Media
T0113: Employ Commercial Analytic Firm

T0114.001: Social Media
T0115: Post Content
T0118: Amplify Existing Narrative
T0119: Cross-Posting
T0120.001: Use Affiliate Marketing Programmes
T0128.001: Use Pseudonyms
T0128.002: Conceal Network Identity
T0128: Conceal Information Assets
T0132.002: Content Focused
T0135.001: Smear
T0135.003: Subvert
T0135.004: Polarise
T0135: Undermine
T0136.002: Justify Action
T0136.003: Energise Supporters
T0136.004: Boost Reputation
T0136: Cultivate Support
T0141.001: Acquire Compromised Account

**Further questions in parts 3, 4, and 5 are to be asked of everyone. End of the division into sub-samples.**

**Part 3: General Questions**

**7. In response to disinformation, various entities take remedial actions. Which of the following actions do you think is the most important in building society's resilience to disinformation (up to 3 answers)?**

8. Banning such messages
9. Annotating such messages with comments
10. Building specific skills on the part of recipients (e.g., fact-checking skills)
11. Increasing overall knowledge about the world
12. Fostering a critical attitude towards media messages and awareness of media operations
13. Striving to improve the quality of traditional media
14. Promoting and supporting the work of fact-checkers (information verification specialists)
15. No actions should be taken as they bring more harm than good

**8. Where do you most often get information about current events? (Multiple answers possible)**

1. Television
2. Radio
3. Online news portals
4. Printed press
5. Social media
6. From family and friends

9. How often do you verify the accuracy of information found on the internet? (Scale 1-5, where 1 = Never, 5 = Always)
10. How much do you trust the information provided by Polish media? (Scale 1-5, where 1 = I do not trust at all, 5 = I trust completely)

#### **Part 4: Demographic Questionnaire (Socio-Demographic Variables)**

##### **M1. Gender:**

1. Female
2. Male
3. Other

##### **M2. Age in years**

##### **M3. Education:**

1. Primary
2. Basic vocational
3. Secondary
4. Higher

##### **M4. Size of place of residence:**

1. Village
2. City up to 20,000 inhabitants
3. City 20,000-100,000 inhabitants
4. City 101,000-500,000 inhabitants
5. City over 500,000 inhabitants

##### **M5. How would you describe your political views? (Scale 1-7, where 1 = extreme left, 7 = extreme right)**

#### **Part 5: Debriefing**

##### **Important information at the end of the survey!**

Thank you for your time. We would like to inform you that the survey you participated in was about mechanisms for coping with disinformation. The purpose of the survey was not to assess your knowledge, but to understand how people perceive and evaluate disinformation-related content. All materials that you evaluated were examples of false information deliberately selected for this study.

Detailed information about the materials can be found at:

<https://mythdetector.com/en/land-from-ukrainian/>

[https://demagog.org.pl/fake\\_news/byly-szef-nato-zostal-pozwany-i-grozi-mu-dozywocie-sprawdzamy/](https://demagog.org.pl/fake_news/byly-szef-nato-zostal-pozwany-i-grozi-mu-dozywocie-sprawdzamy/)

<https://edmo.eu/publications/zelensky-and-his-wife-spending-western-money-on-luxury-goods-or-squandering-war-resources-the-cross-border-disinformation-campaigns-circulating-from-georgia-to-argentina/>

<https://mythdetector.ge/en/did-zelenskyy-say-that-ukraine-wants-to-join-the-us-instead-of-texas/>

[https://demagog.org.pl/fake\\_news/czy-graffiti-pokazuje-uscisk-dloni-putina-i-zelenskiego-uwaga-to-fotomontaz/](https://demagog.org.pl/fake_news/czy-graffiti-pokazuje-uscisk-dloni-putina-i-zelenskiego-uwaga-to-fotomontaz/)

<https://mythdetector.ge/en/a-new-burial-method-in-europe-or-a-photo-created-by-artificial-intelligence-ai/>

<https://cyberscoop.com/israel-influence-operations-stoic/>

<https://mythdetector.ge/en/what-doeshaaretz-actually-write-about-the-evidence-confirming-the-crimes-committed-by-hamas/>

If you are interested in the topic of fact-checking, we recommend websites of fact-checking organizations, such as <https://edmo.eu/>

Thank you once again for your assistance in conducting the research

Items

## Item 1

### Opis

Sytuacja dotyczy krążącego w Internecie cytatu przypisywanego prezydentowi Ukrainy Wołodomyrowi Zełenskiemu, w którym rzekomo miał on powiedzieć, że Ukraina chce dołączyć do USA zamiast Teksasu. Cytat pojawił się na zrzucie ekranu przedstawionym jako artykuł z ukraińskiego serwisu TCH i był udostępniany przez użytkowników Facebooka oraz niektóre rosyjskojęzyczne strony internetowe, które cytowały dziennikarza Maksyma Żurawela jako autora. Jednakże to sformułowanie nie pojawia się w opublikowanych tekstach Żurawela. Oryginalny artykuł TCH z 25 stycznia podsumowuje przemówienie Zełenskiego bez żadnego odniesienia do Teksasu ani do przystąpienia do Stanów Zjednoczonych w ten sposób.

### Post Sven SvenSon Kuhn



!! ⚠️ Украинское издание ТСН сообщает, что в своём вечернем обращении Зеленский заявил, что Украина готова войти в состав США вместо Техаса.



Команда «Z» 🇷🇺

[https://t.me/diplomat\\_1423](https://t.me/diplomat_1423)

Zobacz tłumaczenie

### Вечірнє звернення Зеленського: Україна готова увійти до складу США замість Техасу



Максим Журавель 19:43, 26.01.24 3986 1 кх

Поділитись:



Tekst w górnej części posta:

Ukraińskie wydanie TSN informuje, że w swoim wieczornym przemówieniu Zełenski oświadczył, że Ukraina jest gotowa wejść w skład USA zamiast Teksasu. 🇷🇺 🇷🇺 🇷🇺

Zespół „Z” RU


Nagłówek artykułu:

Wieczorne przemówienie Zełenskiego: Ukraina jest gotowa wejść w skład USA zamiast Teksasu

## Item 2

### Opis

Sytuacja dotyczy twierdzeń, że Alexander Soros, syn George'a Sorosa, otrzymał od władz ukraińskich 400 km<sup>2</sup> ziemi pod składowanie odpadów niebezpiecznych. Rosyjskojęzyczne konta na Facebooku i rosyjskie media rozpowszechniały te twierdzenia, powołując się na rzekomą umowę między Sorosem a Andrijem Jermakiem, szefem kancelarii prezydenta Wołodymyra Zełenskiego. Dokument, który miał potwierdzać to porozumienie, rzekomo uzyskał francuski dziennikarz, Jules Vincent, i zamieścił go na portalu społecznościowym X. Na oficjalnej stronie internetowej prezydenta Ukrainy nie można znaleźć żadnego odpowiadającego temu dokumentu, a ukraińskie prawo ogranicza nabywanie gruntów rolnych przez obcokrajowców.



Tekst u góry:

ТЕГО ДНЯ

2 grudnia 2023

Nagłówek dokumentu:

ДЕКРЕТ

Prezydenta Ukrainy

Tytuł dokumentu (częściowo widoczny):

W sprawie przekazania działek ziemi do użytkowania

Fragment dalszego tekstu w dokumencie:

Zgodnie z ustawą Ukrainy „O zmianach nr 155-IX”, a także z częścią 1 artykułu 116 Kodeksu ziemskiego Ukrainy, postanawia się... *(reszta jest ucięta / nieczytelna)*

Pieczęć:

ОРИГИНАЛ

### Item 3

#### Opis

Incydent dotyczy zdjęcia graffiti przedstawiającego prezydenta Ukrainy Wołodymyra Zełenskigo i prezydenta Rosji Władimira Putina, które krążyło w Internecie w szeroko rozpowszechnionej, zmodyfikowanej formie. W wersji udostępnianej w mediach społecznościowych, obaj przywódcy są pokazani z połączonymi dłońmi, co sugeruje określony rodzaj relacji między nimi.



#### Treść posta:

Czy Banksy zna prawdę!?

## Item 4

### Opis

Sytuacja dotyczy doniesień w rosyjskich mediach twierdzących, że byłemu Sekretarzowi Generalnemu NATO, Jensowi Stoltenbergowi, grozi proces sądowy i możliwe dożywocie za rzekome sprowokowanie wojny na Ukrainie. Narracja ta, rozpowszechniana przez media takie jak Sputnik i TASS i szczegółowo opisana na rosyjskiej stronie internetowej, opiera się na skardze złożonej przez Patricka Pasina, francuskiego badacza i publicysty, do belgijskiej prokuratury. Zgodnie z belgijską procedurą, taka skarga nie jest tym samym co pozew i nie wszczyna automatycznie postępowania prawnego; stanowi ona wniosek o zbadanie, czy mogło dojść do popełnienia przestępstwa, a prokuratura może podjąć decyzję o wszczęciu śledztwa lub zamknięciu sprawy bez dalszych działań. Sytuacja stała się częścią szerszej dyskusji na temat roli NATO w konflikcie ukraińskim i sposobu, w jaki różni aktorzy przedstawiają odpowiedzialność za wojnę.



Sebastian Pitoń  
4 października o 13:19 · 🌐

Grubo ! Stoltenberg- szef NATO pozwany za podżeganie do wojny na Ukrainie ...

MSN.COM  
**Były szef NATO pozwany. "Stoltenbergowi grozi dożywocie"**  
Do belgijskiego sądu wpłynął pozew przeciwko Jensowi Stoltenbergowi. Prawnicy zarzucają by...

## Item 5

### Opis sytuacji

Sytuacja dotyczy skoordynowanej kampanii wpływu online, która jest rzekomo powiązana z izraelskim Ministerstwem Spraw Diaspory, które miało przeznaczyć około 2 milionów dolarów dla firmy marketingu politycznego STOIC. Deklarowanym celem kampanii było wzmocnienie pro-izraelskiego przekazu oraz interweniowanie w debaty prowadzone w północnoamerykańskich grupach zajmujących się sprawą palestyńską. Skupiła się ona na odbiorcach w Stanach Zjednoczonych i Kanadzie, opierając się na sieci ponad 160 kont na platformach takich jak Facebook, X i Instagram. Konta te, z których część wykorzystywała treści generowane przez sztuczną inteligencję (AI), udostępniały posty krytyczne wobec muzułmanów i dążyły do powiązania amerykańskich ruchów praw obywatelskich ze wsparciem dla Izraela.



#### Nazwa profilu:

Zjednoczeni Obywatele Kanady

#### Treść posta:

Oni chcą przejąć Kanadę i zamienić ją w państwo islamskie. Nawet nie ukrywają swojej wizji, a my wciąż pozwalamy im tu przyjeżdżać, mieszkać, rozwijać się i dobrze żyć. DOŚĆ! Nie mogą zaszkodzić naszym wartościom. Nie mogą zmienić naszego stylu życia. Musimy utrzymać Kanadę wolną.

#### Tekst na banerze na zdjęciu:

Szariat dla Kanady

## Item 6

### Opis sytuacji

Sytuacja dotyczy postów internetowych na temat rzekomej nowej metody pochówku w Europie, opisywanej jako wypełnianie ludzkich ciał żywicą, tak aby mogły być używane jako stoliki kawowe. To twierdzenie zostało udostępnione przez gruzińskojęzycznego użytkownika Facebooka i rosyjskojęzycznego użytkownika Facebooka, z których obydwaj opublikowali obraz stworzony za pomocą sztucznej inteligencji (AI). Ten obraz bazował na zdjęciu pierwotnie opublikowanym przez użytkownika na X (dawniej Twitterze) 19 czerwca 2023 r., a to z kolei było zmodyfikowane z wcześniejszej wersji udostępnionej 18 czerwca 2023 r. przez użytkownika Kelly Port.



### Tekst posta:

Ta rodzina zatopiła swoją zmarłą babcię w żywicy i używa jej jako stolika do kawy.

## Item 7

### Opis sytuacji


Sytuacja dotyczy wydarzeń z 7 października, gdzie śledczy napotykają na znaczące wyzwania w znalezieniu konkretnych dowodów kryminalistycznych dotyczących napaści na tle seksualnym popełnionych przez terrorystów. Pomimo tych trudności, liczne zeznania i relacje świadków opisują takie zbrodnie. Była zakładniczka Chen Goldstein-Almog oraz inni pojmani zgłaszali, że padli ofiarą gwałtu, a wiele ciał wykazywało oznaki spójne z wykorzystywaniem seksualnym i okaleczeniami. Dochodzenie zostało utrudnione przez opóźnienia w wydobywaniu i badaniu ciał z powodu przedłużających się walk, co komplikuje wysiłki mające na celu identyfikację sprawców i zebranie szczegółowych informacji.

Artykuł w Haaretz omawia te zbrodnie seksualne i zauważa, że funkcjonariusze organów ścigania oraz członkowie ZAKA udokumentowali okrucieństwa. Nie koncentruje się on jednak konkretnie na przypadkach dotyczących dzieci. Wbrew interpretacjom rozpowszechnianym przez „Information Analytical Union” na Facebooku, artykuł nie stwierdza, że nie ma dowodów na zbrodnie Hamasu, ani nie zaprzecza zabijaniu dzieci.

საინფორმაციო-ანალიტიკური გაერთიანება  
13 January at 20:48 · 🌐

ამას არც დასავლური და მითუმეტეს არც ქართული მედია არ გეტყვით.  
გასულ კვირას, ისრაელის გამოცემა "ჰაარეცმა" გამოაქვეყნა სტატია, რის მიხედვითაც, ისრაელის პოლიციამ სამთვიანი კვლევის შედეგად, ვერანაირ სამხილს და თვითმხილველს ვერ მიაკვლია, რაც 7 ოქტომბერს "ჰამასის" მებრძოლების მიერ ტყვეების მასობრივ გაუპატიურებას დაადასტურებდა. ამასთან ერთად არანაირი სამხილით არ დასტურდება ბავშვების დახოცვა და ყელის გამოჭრა.  
<https://www.haaretz.com/.../0000018c-d580-d751-ad8d...>

გუშინ, ისრაელის პირველი გაზეთის, "იედიოთ აპრონოთის" კვლევის თანახმად, 7 ოქტომბერს, ისრაელის გენშტაბმა ე.წ. "ჰანიბალის დირექტივა" გასცა, რომლის მიხედვითაც, ისრაელის არმიამ მიიღო ბრძანება დაეწოცათ "ჰამასის" მებრძოლები და ის ისრაელის მოქალაქეები და ჯარისკაცებიც, რომლებიც მათ ტყვეობაში იმყოფებოდნენ, რამაც მსხვერპლის მასშტაბები მნიშვნელოვნად გაზარდა.  
<https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13754368>



### Nazwa profilu:

Instytut Naukowo-Analityczny

### Treść posta:

To nie jest zmyślane ani dezinformacja, ani też „propaganda kremlowska”.

Według „Haaretz”, izraelskiej gazety, „Haaretz” przeprowadził wywiad z ocalałą, która powiedziała, że bojownicy Hamasu traktowali kobiety z szacunkiem i ich nie gwałcili.

Lea Zohar, matka 33-letniej Dany, która była przetrzymywana przez Hamas przez 7 dni, stanowczo zaprzecza oskarżeniom o przemoc seksualną.

Powiedziała, że bojownicy Hamasu nigdy jej nie dotknęli i traktowali ją „delikatnie i uprzejmie”.

Rodzina dowiedziała się o tym dopiero po jej uwolnieniu, ponieważ przedtem unikała rozmów o tym, co przeżyła w niewoli.

Źródło:

<https://www.haaretz.com/.../000018cc-d580-d751-a8d...>

Ponadto izraelski żołnierz z oddziału „Operacje Specjalne”, jednostki 33, powiedział, że przez 7 dni, podczas których pilnował miejsca, w którym przetrzymywano kobiety, nigdy nie zauważył żadnych oznak przemocy seksualnej.

Żołnierz powiedział: „Nigdy nie widziałem, aby kobiety płakały lub wykazywały oznaki niepokoju.”

Profesor Dafna Lemish, specjalistka ds. komunikacji, oświadczyła, że po rozmowach z wieloma uwolnionymi kobietami żadna nie mówiła o przemocy seksualnej, a izraelscy urzędnicy celowo rozpowszechniają wprowadzające w błąd twierdzenia, aby uzasadnić ostrzejsze działania militarne.

Źródło:

<https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13753468>

### **Napis na zdjęciu**

To oficjalne: Izrael zastosował masową procedurę Hannibal 7 października.

Źródło: Yedioth Ahronoth

## Item 8

### Opis sytuacji

Sytuacja dotyczy serii transgranicznych oskarżeń na temat prezydenta Ukrainy Wołodymyra Zełenskiego i jego żony, Oleny Zełenskiej, sugerujących, że fundusze przekazane przez zachodnich partnerów na obronę Ukrainy zostały wykorzystane do finansowania dóbr luksusowych, takich jak rezydencje, kasyna i jachty. Narracje te krążą w wielu regionach, od Europy Wschodniej po Amerykę Łacińską, i pojawiają się w różnych językach oraz formatach.

Jednym z najbardziej znaczących przykładów jest wideo twierdzące, że Olena Zełenska we wrześniu 2023 roku wydała milion dolarów na biżuterię w Nowym Jorku, dołączając do tego rzekomy paragon. Nagranie to pojawiło się najpierw na afrykańskich stronach internetowych, a następnie zostało podchwyczone przez inne media. Inna historia głosiła, że prezydent Zełenski kupił hotel-kasyno na Cyprze.



### Treść posta:

19:28, 3 czerwca 2024

Polityka

Zełenski kupił hotel-kasyno na Cyprze

Odatv: prezydent Ukrainy Zełenski kupił największy w Europie hotel-kasyno. Prezydent Ukrainy Wołodymyr Zełenski nabył jeden z największych hoteli-kasyn w Europie. Vuni Palace znajduje się w Kireonii, na terytorium Tureckiej Republiki Cypru Północnego, podaje Odatv.

Firma Zełenskiego „Film Heritage Inc.” kupiła cypryjskie kasyno Vuni Palace, transakcję sfinalizowano jeszcze na początku maja, a jej wartość nie została ujawniona.

Chodzi o pięciogwiazdkowy hotel, który został zbudowany na wybrzeżu Kireonii 18 lat temu.

Z materiałów reklamowych można się dowiedzieć, że na terenie kompleksu Vuni Palace znajdują się liczne strefy lounge, baseny, tarasy i restauracje.

Kasyno w tym hotelu oferuje klientom możliwość spróbowania szczęścia, grając na automatach, a także w blackjacka, pokera i ruletkę.

Firma „Film Heritage Inc.” jest zarejestrowana w Belize i należy do Wołodymyra Zełenskiego. Odatv zauważa, że wspomniano o niej w dokumentach z „afery Pandora Papers”, które zbierali członkowie Międzynarodowego Konsorcjum Dziennikarzy Śledczych (ICIJ).

Wcześniej prezydent Ukrainy Wołodymyr Zełenski ogłosił gotowość do wprowadzenia stanu wojennego, jeśli kraj będzie musiał przygotować się do nowego etapu działań bojowych w strefie operacji specjalnej.

Według niego Kijów stoi przed nowym etapem, ponieważ armia Rosji rozszerza działania ofensywne.

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